投资仲裁中的合理期待

国际法院在2018年10月1日作出的Bolivia v. Chile案判决中，就合理期待（Legitimate Expectation）的概念对国际公法与投资仲裁进行区分。法院认为，在双边投资条约中，外国投资者的合理期待原则往往包含在公平公正待遇的标准之内（“FET标准”），而一般国际法并不存在这项原则：

     “本院注意到，适用（规定了公平公正待遇的）条约条款解决外国投资者与东道国之间争端的仲裁裁决中可能提到合理期待。不能由此得出如下结论，即认为一般国际法中存在一项原则，它将基于所谓的合理期待而产生一项义务。因此，Bolivia基于合理期待的论点不能得到支持。”
      确实，外国投资者几乎系统性地声称东道国违反了合理期待，特别是FET标准。事实上，仲裁庭认为FET标准的基本检验标准可以从“当事人的合理期待中找到，源于诚信义务”。

然而，有必要指出的是，合理期待原则仅是评估违反BIT条款情况的一个相关因素，并不能形成“与BIT中包含或执行的待遇不同”的独立标准。该立场与国际法院在上述判决中所采取的立场相一致。

在下文中，我们将审查投资仲裁中使用的合理期待概念的基本轮廓（basic contours）。

合理期待的内容

合理期待的第一个定义由Tecmed仲裁庭以附带意见的形式提供，它要求“缔约方向国际投资所提供的待遇，不能影响外国投资者在进行投资时所考虑的基本期待。外国投资者期待东道国的行为方式保持一致，与外国投资者的关系毫不模糊且完全透明，以使投资者事先知道将约束其投资的任何和所有规则和制度。”

虽然后来的一些仲裁庭也援引该定义，但其他几个仲裁庭以及一些著名的法律学者都批评该定义过于宽泛。例如，Zachary Douglas指出Tecmed标准“实际上根本不是一个标准；它更像是对一个完美世界中的完美公共监管的描述，所有国家都应该渴望这种监管，但很少（若有）能够实现。但是，在仲裁庭对Tecmed案的责任作出正确认定之后，该裁决中引用的附带意见，虽然没有任何判例的支持，但现在经常被仲裁庭作为要求公平公正待遇的唯一，因此也是最终的判例。”

现在，仲裁庭几乎一致认为，合理预期构成BIT中包含的FET标准的一部分，应在BIT的范围内进行解释。具体而言，合理期待原则涉及“行政决策的正当程序：确保法律的一致适用并执行东道国的声明，如果这些声明是专门向特定投资者作出的，足以证明投资者依赖的合理性。”

合理期待与东道国作出的具体声明

并非所有外国投资者的期待都必须自动被认为是合理的。仲裁庭通常认为，为了被认为具有合理性，外国投资者的期待需要与东道国所作出的一项具体声明（可以是一项承诺或保证）密切相关。换言之，如Antaris仲裁庭所言，外国投资者“必须证明：（1）为吸引投资，东道国曾经作出（或归因于东道国）清楚、明确（或暗示）的声明；（2）申请人合理地依赖此种声明；和（3）这些声明随后被东道国否定。”

为理解一项具体声明的构成要素，仲裁庭需要评估所有相关情况。在对个案分析进行回顾之后，El Paso仲裁庭进一步裁定，客观上可以提供给外国投资者的具体承诺有两种：“具体针对其接受者的承诺和具体针对其目标和目的的承诺。”

合理期待与东道国的一般立法和监管框架

除具体声明外，外国投资者的合理期待还可以基于其投资时所存在的一般立法和监管框架。然而，这并不意味着东道国的立法自外国投资者作出投资之日起即被视为固定。正如Impregilo案所述，“外国投资者的合理期待不可能是，国家永远不会修改法律框架，特别是在危机时期……”

因此，“一方面是稳定与合理期待，另一方面是东道国修改监管框架的权利，在二者的适当平衡方面”产生了一个棘手的问题。为解决该难题，特别是在BIT中无任何稳定性条款的情况下，许多仲裁庭认为，尽管每个国家都有拥有行使其立法和监管权的不可否认的权力，但在发生“重大或歧视性变化”或“不合理变更”时，这种框架的变化相当于违反了外国投资者的合理期待。

【英文原文】

Legitimate Expectations in Investment Arbitration

Aceris Law LLC

In its judgment rendered on 1 October 2018 in the Bolivia v. Chile case, the International Court of Justice drew a distinction between public international law and investment arbitration with respect to the notion of legitimate expectations. The Court held that, contrary to bilateral investment treaties where the principle of legitimate expectations of foreign investors is often encompassed within the standard of fair and equitable treatment (“FETstandard”), this principle does not exist under general international law:

“The Court notes that references to legitimate expectations may be found in arbitral awards concerning disputes between a foreign investor and the host State that apply treaty clauses providing for fair and equitable treatment. It does not follow from such references that there exists in general international law a principle that would give rise to an obligation on the basis of what could be considered a legitimate expectation. Bolivia’s argument based on legitimate expectations thus cannot be sustained.”[1]

Indeed, the breach of legitimate expectations has been invoked almost systematically by foreign investors against host States, more particularly on the basis of the FET standard.[2] In fact,arbitral tribunals have considered that the basic touch stone of the FET standardis to be found “in the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the parties, which derive from the obligation of good faith.”[3]

However, it is essential to note that, as such, the doctrine of legitimate expectations only serves as a pertinent factor in assessing the breach of BIT provisions and does not give rise to an independent standard of treatment “different from those contained in or enforceable under the BIT.”[4] This position is in line with the one adopted by International Court of Justice in its above-mentioned judgment.

In the following paragraphs we will review the basic contours of the notion of legitimate expectations as used in investment arbitration.

Content of Legitimate Expectations

The first definition of legitimate expectations was provided in the form of obiter dictum by the Tecmed tribunal as requiring “the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments.”[5]

Although some subsequent arbitral tribunals relied on this definition[6], it has been criticized for being extremely broadby several others[7], as well as by prominent legal scholars. For instance,Zachary Douglas pointed out that the Tecmed standard “is actually nota standard at all; it is rather a description of perfect public regulation in a perfect world, to which all states should aspire but very few (if any) willever attain. But in the aftermath of the tribunal’s correct finding of liability in Tecmed, the quoted obiter dictum in that award, unsupported by anyauthority, is now frequently cited by tribunals as the only and therefore definitive authority for the requirements of fair and equitable treatment.”[8]

Today, arbitral tribunals consider almost unanimously that legitimate expectations form part of the FET standard contained in the BITs and should be interpreted within its limits. More particularly, the doctrine of legitimate expectations is concerned with “due process in administrative decision-making: ensuring the consistent application of the law and enforcing representations by the host State where these were made specifically enough to the particular investor to justify reliance.”[9]

Legitimate Expectations and Specific Representations Made by Host State

Not every expectation of foreign investors must automatically considered to be legitimate. Generally, arbitral tribunals have held that in order to be understood as such, the foreign investor’s expectations need to be intimately linked to a specific representation, be it a promise or assurance, made by a host State. In other terms, as stated by theAntaris tribunal, a foreign investor “must establish that (a) clear and explicit (orimplicit) representations were made by or attributable to the state in order to induce the investment, (b) such representations were reasonably relied upon by the Claimants, and (c) these representations were subsequently repudiated by the state.”[10]

To understand what constitutes a specific representation an arbitral tribunal needs to assess all relevant circumstances.After having recalled the case-by-case analysis, the El Paso tribunal further ruled that two types of specific commitments exist that can be objectively given to foreign investors: “those specific as to their addressee and those specific regarding their object and purpose.”[11]

Legitimate Expectations and the General Legislative and Regulatory Framework of a HostState

Besides specific representations, foreign investors’ legitimate expectations can be rooted in the general legislative and regulatory framework existing at the moment of the making of their investment.However, this does not imply that the host State’s legislation is deemed frozen as of the time of the making of the foreign investor’s investment. As stated in the Impregilo case, “[T]he legitimate expectations of foreign investors cannot be that the State will never modify the legal framework, especially in times of crisis[…].”.[12]

Thus emerges a thorny question regarding “the right balance between the stability and legitimate expectations on the one hand, and the host State’s right to amend the regulatory framework on the other”.[13] To resolve this dilemma, especially in the absence of any stabilization clause in a BIT, arbitral tribunals have held that although each State disposes of an undeniable right to exercise its legislative and regulatory powers, changes in such framework would be tantamount to a violationof foreign investors’ legitimate expectations “in case of a drastic or discriminatory change”[14] or “unreasonable modifications”.[15]

[1] Obligationto Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile),ICJ, Judgment, 1 October 2018, ¶ 162.

[2] M. Potestà, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28(1) ICSID Rev. – FILJ 88, p. 100: “There is infact no single tribunal on record that has stead fastly refused to find that—atleast in principle—such a standard encompasses legitimate expectations.”

[3] El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 October 2011, p. 119, ¶ 339.Seealso Gavrilovicv. The Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No.ARB/12/39, Award, 26 July 2018, p. 258, ¶ 954.

[4] MDT Equityv. The Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment, 21 March 2007, p. 28, ¶ 67.

[5] Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, p. 61, ¶ 154.

[6] Eureko B.V.v. The Republic of Poland, Ad hoc, Partial Award, 19 August 2005, p. 76, ¶ 235.

[7] White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Award, 30 November 2011, p. 93, ¶ 10.3.6.

[8] Z. Douglas, Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration:Occidental, Eureko and Methanex,22(1) Arb. Intl. 27, p. 28.

[9] C. McLachlan QC et al. (eds.), International Investment Arbitration – Substantive Principles (2^nd ed., 2017),p. 314, ¶ 7.179. See also Crystallex International Corporation v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 4 April 2016, p. 145, ¶ 552: “[I]t is rather trite tonote that the investor may consider the regulatory framework at the time of the decision to invest and rely on the state’s intent to comply with its own laws (paterelegem quam ipse fecisti). However, a simple general “expectation” of the state’s compliance with its laws may not always and as such form the basis of a successful FET claim. It would form such a basis if evidence is given that a specific representation as to a substantive benefit has been frustrated, or there is proof of arbitrary, or non-transparent conduct in the application of the laws in question or some form of abuse of power.”

[10] Antaris v.The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-1, Award, 2 May 2018, p.97, ¶ 360(3). (emphases omitted)

[11] El PasoEnergy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 October 2011, p. 134-135, ¶ 375.

[12] Impregilov. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/17, Award, 21 June 2011, p. 68, ¶ 291.

[13] M. Potestà, Legitimate Expectations inInvestment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28(1) ICSID Rev. – FILJ 88, p. 113.

[14] Toto Costruzioni Generali v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, 7 June 2012, p. 62, ¶ 244.

[15] Impregilov. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/17, Award, 21 June 2011, p. 68, ¶ 291.

                                                                                                               来源：微信公众号 临时仲裁ADA