香港法院可以谨慎地向非当事人下达临时救济命令

Company A and Others v Company B and Others [2018] HKCU 3575案的裁定确认，香港法院可以裁定临时救济以支持仲裁，即使是针对非仲裁当事人的个人或实体。但该权力将谨慎行使。同样，法院也将缓慢批准接管令，尽管用法官的话说，这些命令“具有季节性”。

背 景

被告未全额支付原告出售并转让给被告“RCo”股权款项。出售之后，被告唯一的实质资产就是RCo股权。RCo持有泰国领先能源公司Thai Co 59%的股权。被告是由X先生控制的特殊目的机构。

这些销售协议约定在新加坡国际商会（ICC）进行仲裁，原告正式开始对第一和第二被告提起仲裁。原告随后得知，被告试图将RCo股权转让给第三方。这将使Thai Co股权无法支付任何有利于原告的裁决。原告在英属维尔京群岛（BVI）获得一项针对第一被告（一家BVI公司）的禁令，阻止其出售RCo股权。他们还从ICC紧急仲裁员获得一项命令（2月16日）：

  阻止第一和第二被告处置RCo股权；

  阻止第一被告采取与处置和/或转让RCo股权和/或为其设立负担有类似经济影响的任何其他行动；

  要求第二被告担保获得第一被告的遵守。

原告要求紧急仲裁员就这些股权授予接管令，但遭到拒绝，理由是原告已得到其他紧急命令和BVI禁令的充分保护，而且未证明对接管人的迫切需要。

2017年9月，仲裁庭扩充了2月16日命令，禁止被告在向原告全额支付款项之前以任何方式处置Thai Co股权。2017年10月，原告发现RCo以明显低价将Thai Co股权出售给X先生的父亲Y先生。2017年7月和8月，38%的Thai Co股权被转移给第三被告。原告在香港法院获得一项禁令（5月18日禁令），阻止第三被告处理38%的股权。尽管第三被告不是仲裁当事人，但法院仍然批准了禁令，作为通常的Mareva管辖权的延伸（以所谓的“Chabra”为基础）。

2018年6月25日，第三被告将Y先生的股权转让给Z女士。

2018年6月27日，原告请求香港法院加强5月18日禁令，即通过指定一名接管人持有股权，直到裁决作出。他们声称，2018年6月25日的转让违反了禁令，存在进一步处置的风险。

（另外，Y先生禁止X先生和Z女士处理第三被告的股权，声称他们伪造了转让文件。）

Chan法官要处理的问题是，是否指定一名接管人接管第三被告持有的ThaiCo股权，作为一项临时措施以协助原告与第一和第二被告之间（而第三被告并非当事人）的仲裁。

被告拒绝，理由如下：

  《仲裁条例》（《香港法例》第609章）第45条授权法院下达临时救济命令，以支持香港或香港以外的仲裁，该条并未赋予对仲裁第三方的管辖权——事实上，它明确不适用《UNCITRAL示范法》第17J条关于保留此种管辖权的规定。

  《仲裁条例》第3条规定，法院“只有在本条例明确规定”的情况下干预仲裁。

  将管辖权扩展到第三方是“非常不公平的”，尤其在不允许上诉的情况下（《仲裁条例》第45（10）条）。

  根据1996年《英国仲裁法》第44条作出的判例确认，法院下达临时救济命令的管辖权仅适用于仲裁当事人。

裁 定

法院裁定，《仲裁条例》第45条赋予其为支持仲裁而下达临时救济命令的权力，不限于仲裁当事人，但不应轻易行使。

《仲裁条例》第45条比1996《英国仲裁法》第44条更广泛。它并不排除法院为支持仲裁而下达临时救济命令的一般管辖权。具体而言，法院行使第45条的权力可以“不管仲裁庭是否可能行使类似权力”。此外，法院可根据“任何当事人”的申请授予第45条的救济。这比1996年《仲裁法》的规定“更中立”，“仅凭该条的使用不能表明，临时措施的申请只能由仲裁当事人或仲裁协议当事人提出”。相反，它可以拓展到“法庭上的任何当事人”。《仲裁条例》第21条明确确认在仲裁期间向法院申请临时救济没有不相容之处。此外，香港的法院程序也可以由司法管辖区以外的第三者执行。有鉴于此，“没有必要……把可能批准的临时措施的范围限定在已经明确规定的范围之外”。法院的职责是为仲裁程序提供便利，它有权决定是否授予任何临时救济，无论是否为了支持仲裁。

然而，Chan法官呼吁要保持谨慎，他指出，在将非当事人带至法庭并对其下达不能上诉的命令之前，必须有“明确证据和……强有力的理由”证明有必要为仲裁程序提供便利。

法院裁定，根据事实，它不准备针对第三被告下达接管令。

原告没有对这些股权提出所有权请求，对这些股权也没有担保权益。他们只希望在仲裁庭作出对其有利的裁决时能够得到股权。无论如何，被告（或X先生）对第三被告和ThaiCo股权的控制权目前存在争议，并将面临单独的法律程序。此外，尚不清楚被告处置ThaiCo股权的行为是否违反BVI和紧急禁令；在转让时，这些禁令只禁止处置RCo股权。原告依据的是2月16日命令，该命令禁止第一被告采取“与处置行为具有类似经济影响的任何其他行动”。然而，目前尚不确定RCo对 ThaiCo股权的处置是否实际上违反了该命令。无论由法院作出还是由仲裁庭作出，禁令的条款应当“精确”，使得被禁止的当事人知道哪些行为将违反禁令。任何含糊之处将被解释为有利于被指控违反命令的当事人。

此外，每个被告、RCo和ThaiCo都是独立的法律实体。法官感到不满的是，为了实现一份仲裁裁决，第三被告将被迫返还ThaiCo股权，以为替代第一和第二被告的资产。因此，对于非当事人符合“Chabra”Mareva救济的检验标准，法官对此感到不满。

最后，Chan法官认为，通过现有禁令和保证，原告在防止ThaiCo股权被进一步处置方面已得到充分保护，因此不需要授予接管令。这些“较不具侵入性”的救济将优于“严厉的”接管令。

法官还驳回了关于香港禁令在泰国法律下不被承认的论点和专家证据，因而限制ThaiCo股权交易的禁令难以“监督”。她认为，这一点应当在5月18日禁令的听证会上澄清，因为如果前述论点正确，禁令无论如何均无效。法官还裁定，专家证据不予采信，因为报告未包含专家声明。

讨 论

在本案中，原告请求签发股权接管令，以用于实现对其有利的任何仲裁裁决。Chan法官指出，此类命令是“严厉的”和“侵入性的”，除非有“确凿证据”表明资产可能被分散，或基于其他明确事实证明申请的正当性，否则不应轻易批准。如果存在一种侵入性较低的救济，法院将特别缓慢地授予接管令。

法官提醒我们，禁令的措辞必须清楚，以使被禁制的当事人知道哪些行为将构成对禁令的违反。任何含糊之处将被解释为有利于被指控违反命令的当事人。请求禁令的当事人必须注意要明确、全面地起草禁令，不得增加不必要的义务。

这一案件提醒我们，遵守法院的程序要求非常重要，尽管其表面看来是次要的。法官裁定对原告的外国法律专家提交的证据不予采信，因为该报告没有根据《高等法院规则》第38号命令第37（C）条规则的要求提供专家声明。

【英文原文】

Hong Kong courts can order interim relief against non-parties—but only sparingly

The decision in Company A and Others v Company B and Others [2018] HKCU 3575 confirms that Hong Kong courts can order interim relief in support of an arbitration, even against a person or entity which is not party to the arbitration. However, that power will be exercised sparingly. Similarly, the court will be slow to grant receivership orders, despite such orders being—in the judge’s words—‘flavour of the season’.

Background

The defendants failed to pay in full for shares in ‘RCo’, which the plaintiffs had sold and transferred to them. Following the sale, the defendants’ only material assets were the RCo shares. RCo held 59% of ThaiCo, a leading Thai energy company. The defendants were SPVs, controlled by Mr X.

The sale agreements provided for International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration in Singapore, which the plaintiffs duly commenced against the first and second defendants.They then learned that the defendants were seeking to transfer the RCo shares to a third party. This would make the ThaiCo shares unavailable to satisfy any award in the plaintiffs’ favour. The plaintiffs obtained an injunction in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) courts against the first defendant (a BVI company), to prevent it disposing of the RCo shares. They also obtained anorder (February 16 Order) from an ICC emergency arbitrator:

preventing the first and second defendants from disposing of the RCo shares

preventing the first defendant from taking ‘any other action having an economic effect similar to the disposal and/or transfer and/or encumbrance of’ the RCo shares

requiring the second defendant to procure the first defendant’s compliance

The plaintiffs asked the emergency arbitrator to grant a receivership order over the shares, but they declined, on grounds that the plaintiffs were sufficiently protected by the other emergency orders and the BVI injunction, and had failed to establish an urgent need for a receiver.

In September 2017, the arbitral tribunal extended the February 16 order, preventing the defendant sfrom disposing of the ThaiCo shares ‘in any manner until the [full price] is paid to the plaintiffs’. In October 2017, the plaintiffs discovered that RCo had sold the ThaiCo shares to Mr X’s father, Mr Y, at a significant undervalue (April 16 Transaction). In July and August 2017, 38% of the Thai Co shares were transferred to the third defendant. The plaintiffs obtained an injunction inthe HK court, restraining the third defendant from dealing with that 38% (May 18 Injunction). The court granted the injunction, despite the fact that the third defendant is not party to the arbitration, as an extension to its usual Mareva jurisdiction (on the so-called ‘Chabra’ basis).

On 25 June 2018, the third defendant transferred the shares from Mr Y to Mrs Z.

On 27 June 2018, the plaintiffs asked the Hong Kong court to reinforce the May 18 Injunction by appointing a receiver to hold the shares until the award was issued. They alleged that the 25 June 2018 transfer was in breach of the injunction, and there was a risk of further disposals.

(Separately, Mr Y had injuncted Mr X and Mrs Z from dealing with the shares in the third defendant, alleging that they had forged the transfer documents.)

The issue for Chan J was whether to appoint a receiver over the ThaiCo shares held by the third defendant, as an interim measure in aid of the arbitration between the plaintiffs and the first and second defendants, to which the third defendant is not party.

The defendants resisted, onthe following grounds:

section 45 of the Arbitration Ordinance, Chapter 609 (AO), which empowers the court to order interim relief in support of an arbitration in or outside Hong Kong, does not confer jurisdiction over third parties to the arbitration—indeed, it expressly disapplies Article 17J UNCITRAL Model Law, which preserves such jurisdiction

AO,s 3 provides that the court shall interfere in arbitration ‘only as expressly provided for in the Ordinance’

it would be ‘grossly unjust’ to extend the jurisdiction to third parties, particularly as there is no appeal (AO, s 45(10))

case law under section 44 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) confirms that the court’s jurisdiction to order interim relief extends only to parties to the arbitration

Decision

The court held that its AO,s 45 power to order interim relief in support of an arbitration is not limited to parties to the arbitration, but should not be exercised lightly.

AO, s 45 is broader than AA 1996, s 44. It does not oust the court’s general jurisdiction to order interim relief in support of an arbitration. Specifically, the court’s s 45 powers maybe exercised ‘irrespective of whether or not similar powers may be exercised by the tribunal’. In addition, the court may grant s 45 relief on the application of ‘any party’. This is ‘more neutral’ than AA 1996, and ‘does not by its mere use indicate that the application for interim measure can only be made by a party to the arbitration or arbitration agreement’. On the contrary, it may extend to ‘any party before the court’. AO, s 21 expressly confirms there is no incompatibility in applying to the court for interim relief during an arbitration. Moreover, it is possible to serve HK court process on a third party outside the jurisdiction. In light of all this, there is ‘no need to…confine the scope of the [s 45] interim measures which may be granted,beyond what is already expressly set out.’ The court’s role is to facilitate the arbitral process, and it has discretion whether to grant any interim relief, whether or not in support of arbitration.

However, Chan J urged caution, noting that there must be ‘clear evidence, and…strong grounds’ that it is necessary to facilitate the arbitral proceedings, before bringing a non-party before the court and subjecting it to an order against which there is no appeal.

The court held that, on the facts, it was not prepared to order receivership against the third defendant.

The plaintiffs were not asserting a proprietary claim over the shares, and had no security interest in them. They merely wanted the shares available should the tribunal find in their favour. In any event, the defendants’ (or Mr X’s) control over the third defendant and the ThaiCo shares was now disputed, and subject to separate legal proceedings. Moreover, it was not clear that the defendants breached the BVI and emergency injunctions by disposing of ThaiCo’s shares; at the time of the transfer, those injunctions prevented only the disposal of shares in RCo. The plaintiffs relied on the February 16 order, which prohibited the first defendant from taking ‘any other action having an economic effect similar to the disposal’, etc. However, it is uncertain whether RCo’s disposal of Thai Co shares actually breached that order. An injunction, whether made by a court or tribunal, should be ‘precise in its terms’, so the injuncted party knows what would breach it. Any ambiguity will be construed in favour of the party who is alleged to have breached the order.

In addition, each defendant, RCo and ThaiCo are separate legal entities. The judge was not satisfied that the third defendant would be obliged to disgorge its Thai Co shares to contribute to the first and second defendants’ assets, in order to satisfy an arbitral award. She was therefore not satisfied that the test for ‘Chabra’ Mareva relief against a nonparty was met.

Finally, Chan J felt the plaintiffs were adequately protected against further disposal of the ThaiCo shares by existing injunctions and undertakings, such that she need not grant the receivership order. These ‘less intrusive’ remedies are to be preferred over the ‘draconian’ receivership order.

The judge also rejected arguments and expert evidence that Hong Kong injunctions are not recognised under Thai law, so it would be difficult to ‘police’ the injunctions restraining dealings in the ThaiCo shares. She held that this should have been made clear at the hearing of the May 18 injunction as, if correct, the injunction was futile in any case. The judge also ruled that the expert evidence was inadmissible, because the report contained no expert declaration.

Discussion

In this case, the plaintiffs sought a receivership order over shares that might be used to satisfy any arbitral award in their favour. Chan J noted that such orders are ‘draconian’ and ‘invasive’, and should not be easily granted unless there is ‘solid evidence’ of a risk the assets will be dissipated, or the application is otherwise justified on clear facts. The court will be particularly slow to grant receivership where there is a less intrusive remedy available.

The judge reminds us that injunctions must be clearly worded, so the injuncted party knows what would constitute breach. Any ambiguity will be construed in favour of the party allegedly in breach. Parties who seek injunction orders must take care to draft clearly and comprehensively, without adding unnecessary obligations.

The case also reminds us that it is important to comply with the court’s procedural requirements,however apparently minor. The judge ruled inadmissible the evidence of the Plaintiffs’ foreign law expert, because the report failed to include a declaration by the expert, as required by Order 38 rule 37(C) of the Rules of the High Court.

BY Briana Young

                                                                                                              来源：微信公众号 临时仲裁ADA