法院作出的仲裁员的任免裁定不得上诉

《意大利宪法》第111(7)条规定，当事人有权以适用法律错误为由，就州法院作出的关乎人身自由的最终判决向最高法院提出特别上诉。涉及到人身自由或者身份，似乎是扩张到了刑事诉讼的救济范围。然而，早在1948年,最高法院就将上诉扩大到民事诉讼，特别是当州法院的判决侵犯到了个人的权利或地位。

这种做法沿袭了最高法院的判例法,即法庭作出的判决，即使是以命令或单方的决定(decreto)的形式作出的,如果该裁决影响到（i）人身自由或者身份，以及（ii）产生既判效力(即不可上诉的最终裁定)，也可以根据第111条的规定，提出上诉。

最高法院在最近的两项裁决(总结如下)中明确了其关于州法院干预仲裁程序的权力的立场，即州法院关于任免仲裁员的决定虽然具有终局性，但并不符合第111(7)条上诉的要求。

因此，意大利的法律体制反映了大陆法系的做法。例如，在法国，法官的裁定不可上诉(《法国民事诉讼法》第1460条)。同样，瑞士法律关于国际仲裁的规定，对第179(3)条PILA项下法院任命仲裁员的做法没有任何补救办法，而第180(3)条PILA明确规定，由法院对仲裁员适格问题作出“最终裁决”。反之亦然，英美法系通常对州法院关于任命和适格的决定有相应的规定。(例如，《英国仲裁法》第17(4)和24(6)条)作出补救。

任命仲裁员（最高法院于2018年4月19日作出的9767/2018号裁定）

在本案中，西西里州法院院长宣布，对当事人请求法院行使自由裁量权任命两名仲裁员的申请不予受理 [1]。申请人以该裁定有碍仲裁庭的组成，从而根本地剥夺了当事各方因仲裁协议而获得承认和保护其人身权利为由提起上诉。

最高法院裁定州法院只在一方当事人对仲裁员的任命有异议的情况下，才会对任命仲裁员作出裁定，因此，最高法院驳回了该上诉。州法院的裁定并未解决两方或多方之间实质争端，定纷止争。州法院的干预只是为了弥补当事各方关于协商组成仲裁庭的缺失，不涉及双方的实体上权利义务的争议。因此，不能将州法院的裁定视为根据《意大利宪法》第111(7)条作出的裁定。[2]

关于裁定的终局性，最高法院明确，如果州法院任命了一名仲裁庭成员，之后另一方可以评估其任命的合法性。否则，如果州法院驳回这项申请后，由于当事双方不能协商一致，而没有州法院的干预，会对当事各方造成潜在损害。

在2018年7月9日的第1804 /2018号裁定中，最高法院将上述原则扩大到州法院关于更换仲裁员的裁定。法院认为，根据《意大利宪法》第111(7)条, 因为这些决定对既判判决没有任何实质或程序影响,所以该裁定不可上诉。

仲裁员的免职(最高法院于2017年8月31日作出的20615/2017号裁定,[3])

本案源于仲裁，该案米兰法院院长根据《民事诉讼法》第815(3)条[4]的规定，有权就本案仲裁员的异议作出裁定，因为仲裁员与当事人“意见严重分歧”而将其免职。被免职的仲裁员根据第111(7)条的规定向最高法院提出了上诉。

最高法院认为，首先，《民事诉讼法》第815(3)条明确规定了州法院对仲裁员免职的裁定，一裁终局，不能上诉。此外，法院裁定，根据《宪法》第111条，不能对仲裁员的免职提出上诉，因为州法院的裁定令基本上是行政性质的，只是就程序本身的进行而言的一项职能和工具措施。免职令不影响仲裁庭本身或者仲裁庭的设立标准，也不损害当事人自行指定仲裁员的权利。对仲裁员提出异议的权利不仅能够确保仲裁庭的组成方式合理也能保证仲裁庭公正审理这一公共利益。

 【英文原文】

State courts’ decisions on appointments and removals of arbitrators are final and not subject to extraordinary appeal

By Lukas Innerebner

Article 111(7) of the Italian Constitution grants parties with the right to file an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court on grounds of error in law against any state court final decision regarding personal freedom. The reference to personal freedom would seem to limit the scope of the remedy to criminal actions. However, already in 1948, the Supreme Court of Cassation extended the availability of the appeal to civil proceedings and, in particular, infringement of subjective rights or astatus by state courts’ decisions.

It is settled case-law of the Supreme Court that a court judgement, even if issued in the form of an order (ordinanza)or ex parte decision (decreto), can be subject to an Article 111 appeal if the judgement (i) affects subjective rights or a status, and (ii) has res judicata effects (i.e. when there is no judicial remedy and the judgement is not modifiable or revocable by the court who issued it).

With regard to the state courts’ power to intervene in arbitral proceedings, the Supreme Court confirmed with two recent rulings (summarized below) its position that state courts’ decisions on both appointments and removals, despite having final character, do not fulfill the requirements of the Article 111(7) appeal.

The Italian legal framework mirrors thus the principle applicable in other civil law jurisdictions. In France, for instance, the orders of the juge d’appuì are not appealable (Article 1460 of the French Code of Civil Procedure). Similarly, under Swiss law governing international arbitrations, there is no remedy available against the arbitrator’s appointment by the state court under Article 179(3) PILA, whereasArticle 180(3) PILA explicitly provides that the state court decides “in a final manner” on challenges of arbitrators. Vice versa, common law jurisdictions generally provide for a remedy against state court decisions regarding appointments and challenges (e.g., Sections 17(4) and 24(6) ofthe English Arbitration Act).

· Appointment of arbitrators (Supreme Court decision No. 9767/2018, dated 19 April 2018)

In this case, the president of an Sicilian state court, declared inadmissible a party’s application for the appointment of two arbitrators at the discretion of the court[1]. The applicant appealed the President’s order arguing that the decision prevented the establishment of the arbitral tribunal and thus radically deprived the parties of the right to obtain recognition and protection of their subjective legal positions arising from the arbitration agreement.

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal, ruling that a state court’s order regarding the appointment of an arbitral tribunal’s member is issued due to a disagreement of the parties with regard to the mere appointment of arbitrators. With its order, the state court does not resolve a dispute between two or more parties in the sense of establishing a controversial right or attributing a disputed good. The statecourt’s intervention simply replaces the missing outcome of the parties’ negotiation on the arbitral tribunal’s composition and remains completely aliento the actual dispute. The state court’s order can thus not be regarded as decision under Article 111(7) of the Italian Constitution[2].

As concerns the finality of the order, the Supreme Court clarified that, in case the state court appoints a member of the arbitral tribunal, the latter can subsequently assess the legitimacy of its appointment. Otherwise, in case the state court rejects the application, the potential prejudice to the parties must be attributed to the unsuccessful negotiations on the appointment between the parties and not to the state court’s intervention.

In the decision No. 18004/2018, dated 9 July 2018, the Supreme Court extended the above principle to state courts’ orders regarding the replacement of arbitrators. The Court held that statecourt decisions on the appointment and replacement are not appealable under Article 111(7) of the Italian Constitution because they do not produce any substantial or procedural effects of a res judicata decision.

· Removal of arbitrators (Supreme Court decision No. 20615/2017, dated 31 August 2017[3])

This cases stems from an arbitrationin which the President of the Court of Milan – competent to decide on challenges of arbitrators in this specific case under Article 815(3)[4] of the Code of Civil Procedure – removed an arbitrator for “serious divergence of opinions” with a party. The removed arbitrator lodged an Article 111(7) appeal with the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held, first of all,that Article 815(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly declares a state court’s order on the removal of an arbitrator not subject to appeal and thus final.Moreover, the Court ruled that the removal of an arbitrator cannot be appealed under Article 111 of the Constitution since the state court’s order is of an essentially administrative nature and constitutes a merely functional and instrumental measure regarding the conduct of the procedure itself. The removal order does not affect the arbitral tribunal as such or the criteria for its establishment, nor does it jeopardize the right of the party to the appointment of its own arbitrator. The right to challenge an arbitrator rather protects the correct composition of the arbitral tribunal and the general interest in its impartiality and impartiality[5].

[1] According to Article 810(2) Code of Civil Procedure, if the respondent does not appoint its arbitrator, the claimant may, by way of appeal, “request that the appointment be made by the President of the court in whose jurisdiction the seat of arbitration is situated. If the parties have not yet determined the place of arbitration, the application shall be submitted to the President ofthe court of the place where the arbitration agreement was entered into or, if that place is abroad, to the President of the court of Rome“.

[2] Similar conclusions were drawn by the Supreme Court, inter alia, in the decisions No. 11665/2007 and 3129/2002.

[3] Similar conclusions were drawn by the Supreme Court, inter alia, in the decisions No. 10359/2012 and 8472/2002.

[4] Article 815(3) Code of Civil Procedure: “A challenge shall be lodged by means of an appeal to the President of the Court [in whose district the arbitration is seated] within ten days from notification of the appointment or the knowledge of the grounds for challenge. The President shall issue an order notsubject to appeal, after having heard the challenged arbitrator and the partiesand, if necessary, having considered summary information“.

[5] This principle has also been reflected in the above commented decision No.9767/2018.

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