直面网络安全:仲裁界为如何解决这一难题提供了指引

仲裁界达成初步共识，即在单独的仲裁事项上，各当事方、仲裁机构和仲裁庭必须更加重视网络安全，以便将遭受攻击的风险降至最低。

国际仲裁可能牵涉到当事方是网络攻击的主要目标或潜在目标。作为仲裁程序的一部分，这些当事人可能会公开私密材料以及会接触到可能影响个人、员工、股价、公司战略和政府政策的信息。同样地，仲裁结果可能会对金融市场产生重大影响，这意味着，获得仲裁裁决的草案，可能对网络犯罪分子非常有利可图。因此，特别是在黑客能够确认出监管链中空白之处话，仲裁程序成为网络攻击的首要目标。

过去一年内，对利害关系人来说，可采取若干措施解决在仲裁过程中遇到的网络安全问题,包括由ICCA工作组、纽约律师协会和国际冲突预防和解决机构(CPR),国际律师协会(IBA)拟定网络安全协议草案和网络安全指导方针。

网络攻击之威胁

过去3-5年，针对各类组织的网络攻击数量激增。英国政府于2018年4月25日公布的一项调查发现，在过去12个月里，超过40%的企业遭遇过网络安全入侵或攻击问题。调查结果显示，74%的公司的高管已将网络安全列为头等大事。

黑客的老练和动机有的是出于犯罪投机，也有国家层面的攻击。一些黑客是为了谋求经济利益，另一些黑客可能是出于意识形态方面的动机(还有一些是两者兼而有之)。此外，网络入侵可能来自组织内部，也可能来自组织之外:最近在一起上诉案件中，上诉法院驳回雇主对高等法院裁定的上诉。高等法院裁定，雇主对雇员数据的蓄意入侵负有替代责任。一审法院认为雇主应当采取适当的安全措施来保护员工的个人资料和损害用人单位的声誉和造成经济损失的员工的具体目标,详情请看Wm Morrisons Supermarkets Plc vVarious Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 2339一案。

不管黑客的动机如何，也不管他们与攻击的目标关系如何，实施网络攻击的黑客构成了非常现实的威胁，他们也在极力寻求规避企业网络防御的方法。

仲裁中的网络安全：我们能做些什么？

考虑到这一威胁，人们普遍认为应在国际仲裁过程中尽早解决网络安全问题，相关的利害关系人都应采取合理的网络安全措施。然而,对于仲裁程序中各当事方的责任划分仍有待考虑, 当事人就实施网络安全措施达成协议,当事各方任何措施不平等以及一方不遵守网络安全的指示(或由仲裁过程中的任一当事方所造成的)都会影响到双方寻求解决网络安全威胁。

ICCA网络安全协议

为了推进这一领域的探讨，由ICCA、NYC Bar和CPR代表组成的工作小组拟定了一份网络安全协议草案。目前这项草案正在进行广泛的协商。同时，草案也为仲裁各方与对方当事人、机构和仲裁庭共同审议这些问题提供了一个出发点。一些仲裁机构也考虑到如何为它们受理的仲裁争议提供进一步的指导，更好地履行职责。

在仲裁中可采取与IBA的证据规则相同的方法, 拟定的网络安全协议草案勾勒了一个需要同意适用于仲裁过程的框架(在他们的仲裁协议或仲裁程序中)。

该协议并未明确具体技术性或组织性的措施，以确保在仲裁程序中有适当的网络安全保护措施，也未建立任何违反其条款的责任机制。相反，该协议提议到，由仲裁庭根据案件的具体情况全权裁定何种网络安全措施是“合理的”，即便双方对于应采取何种措施另有共识(见第13条)。关于本条的评注明确指出，当事各方在这方面“不能约束仲裁庭”或“仲裁机构”。

 IBA网络安全指南

最近，IBA发布了由“总统网络安全工作组”制定的更具体的指导方针。这些指导方针是针对律师的。该工作组假设“大型律师事务所将实施网络安全战略”，因此确定了单个执业人员和较小的事务所作为其主要受众。然而，这些建议值得所有利害关系人在仲裁过程中予以考虑。它们包括如下:

§ 技术：确保使用安全的网络，设备加密，登陆u控制，审计日志

§ 组织程序：授权密码保护措施，定期系统监测，执行网络安全政策，考虑网络责任保险

§ 培训：提高对网络安全重要性的认识；给员工必要的网络安全提示和建议

指南认为，个案中何种网络安全措施适当，取决于适用的风险状况。例如，这需要考虑保留数据的敏感性、组织的规模和拟议的安全措施的成本效益。鉴于此，指南附录D至G部分试图根据所涉公司的规模提供网络安全建议。通过类比，这些建议还可以帮助仲裁各方根据所交换数据的敏感性，确定所有参与者需要实施何种网络安全措施。

新的香港国际仲裁中心规则是否预示着仲裁机构会采取填补空白的大动作？

ICCA协议草案和IBA准则共同为利害相关者解决仲裁中的网络安全问题提供了实用指南。至少在某种程度上，议定书草案的空白(例如，工作组没有明确说明应采取何种措施的地方)可以参照准则来填写。

目前，几乎所有国际仲裁，都是通过在线数字通信进行管理的，至少在一定程度上如此。随着仲裁过程的数字化(越来越多的仲裁通过“无纸化”方式运行),机构规则和机构指引需要跟上这一趋势,并确保在个案中他们适当解决网络安全措施,以及仲裁过程中利害关系人之间如何分配责任以确保这些措施得到实施。

于2018年11月1日生效的新的香港国际仲裁中心规则认可这一趋势，其中具体包括作为一个公认的通信方式上传“双方同意使用任何安全在线存储库“(第3.1条(e)的仲裁规则)。其他仲裁机构正考虑如何对其规则进行修改，预计新修订的版本中将更加突出促进网络安全的条款。

结 论

所有的仲裁参与者都需要了解他们该如何接收和存储数据，以及与各种网络安全措施相关的技术复杂性和成本。任何特定的网络安全措施的均衡取决于保密要求和数据的商业敏感性，以及利益相关者的个人数据保护义务(例如，根据欧盟一般数据保护法规(GDPR))。对提高网络安全可用的技术、组织和程序选择的认识，将有助于在许多必要的仲裁网络安全措施中开展有意义的辩论，并为仲裁庭在双方意见不一致的情况下制定适当的秩序提供有说服力的依据。

【英文原文】

Facing cybersecurity head on: the arbitration community develops guidance on how to tackle this difficult issue

There is an emerging consensus among the arbitration community that parties, arbitral institutions and tribunals in individual arbitration matters must give greater attention to cybersecurity in order to minimise the risks of a successful attack.

International arbitrations can involve parties that are prominent targets or potential targets of cyber attacks. As part of the arbitral process, those parties may share material which is not in the public domain and access to which may have the potential to influence individuals, employees, share prices, corporate strategies and government policy.  Similarly, the outcome of an arbitration can have significant repercussions in the financial markets, meaning that obtaining draft forms of arbitral awards could be very lucrative for cybercriminals. As such, the arbitral process is a prime target for cyberattacks, particularly if hackers can identify a weak link in the chain of custody.

Over the last year several tools have become available to assist stakeholders in the arbitral process address issues of cybersecurity, including the draft Cybersecurity Protocol produced by a working group from International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), the New York City Bar Association (NYC Bar) and the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) (see here), and the International Bar Association’s (IBA) Cybersecurity Guidelines (see here).

The threat of cyber attacks

The number of cyber attacks against all types of organisations has rocketed in the last 3-5 years. A UK government survey published on 25 April 2018 found that over 40% of businesses experienced a cybersecurity breach or attack in the last 12 months (accessed here). The survey concluded that cybersecurity is a high priority item for directors or senior managers of 74% of companies.

The sophistication and motivations ofhackers range from criminal opportunism all the way to nation-state level attacks. Some hackers are seeking financial gain, while others are motivated by ideology (and some by a mixture of the two). In addition, cyber breaches can arise from inside as well as outside an organisation: the Court of Appeal recently dismissed an employer’s appeal against the High Court’s finding that it was vicariously liable for an employee’s deliberate data breaches. The first instance decision was upheld notwithstanding the employer having appropriate safeguards in place to protect employee personal data and the employee’s specific aim to damage the employer’s reputation and cause financial loss – see here for further detail on Wm Morrisons Supermarkets Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 2339.

Regardless of their motivation and relationship with the target, hackers carrying out cyberattacks present a veryreal threat and they are increasingly looking for ways to circumvent businesses’ cyber-defences.

Cybersecurity in arbitration: what can be done?

Given this threat, it is broadly accepted that cybersecurity should be addressed early in the international arbitration process and that reasonable cybersecurity measures should be required of all stakeholders. However, considerableu qestions remain as to the responsibilities of each participant in the process, the parties’ autonomy to agree what cybersecurity measures to implement, the impact of any inequality of arms between the parties in seeking to tackle cybersecurity threats, and the consequences of a party’s failure (or for that matter a failure by any participant in the arbitral process) to comply with the cybersecurity directions that aremade.

The ICCA Cybersecurity Protocol

In order to progress the discussion in this area, a working group made up of representatives from ICCA, the NYC Barand CPR produced a draft Cybersecurity Protocol.  This draft is currently undergoing a broad consultation process.  In the meantime, the draft offers parties to arbitration a starting point for considering these issues with their counterparties, institutions and tribunals. Several arbitral institutions are also considering what further guidance, duties or powers to provide in this context for arbitrations that they administer.

Much in the same way as the IBA rules on the taking of evidence can be adopted in any given arbitration, the draft Cybersecurity Protocol outlines a framework which parties would need to agree to apply to their arbitral process (either in their arbitration agreement or after the arbitration has crystallised).

The Protocol does not recommend specific technological or organisational measures to ensure that cybersecurity protections are in place in an arbitration, nor does it establish any liability regime for breaches of its terms. Instead, the Protocol proposes to give overall authority to the tribunal to determine what cybersecurity measures are “reasonable” on a case by case basis, even where the parties themselves are otherwise in agreement on what measures should be taken (see Article 13).The commentary on this Article expressly states that the parties “cannot bind the arbitral tribunal” or the “institution administering the arbitration” in this regard.

The IBA Cybersecurity Guidelines

Further guidelines have recently been issued by the IBA, which were developed by the ‘Presidential Task Force on Cybersecurity’. The Guidelines are aimed at lawyers. The Task Force assumed that “large law firms will have implemented cybersecurity strategies” and, therefore, identified single practitioners and smaller firm as their primary audience. However, these recommendations are worth consideration by all stakeholders in the arbitral process. They include, for instance:

§ Technology: ensuring the use of secure networks, device encryption,access control, audit logs;

§ Organisational processes: mandating password protections, periodic system testing, implementing a cybersecurity policy, considering cyberliability insurance; and

§ Training: raising awareness about the importance of cybersecurity and common threats, giving staff essential cybersecurity tips and advice

The Guidelines acknowledge that appropriate and proportionate cybersecurity measures in any scenario will depend on the applicable risk profile. This requires consideration, for example, of the sensitivity of retained data, the size of the organisation(s) and the cost-effectiveness of the security measures proposed. In light of that,appendices D to G of the Guidelines seek to provide cybersecurity recommendations according to the size of the firm in question. These recommendations could also, by analogy, help parties to arbitration determine what cybersecurity measures are required to be implemented by all participants,in the light of the sensitivity of data to be exchanged.

Filling the gaps: do the new HKIAC rules herald greater institutional involvement?

Together, the ICCA draft Protocol and the IBA Guidelines provide a useful roadmap for all stakeholders to address cybersecurity issues in arbitrations.  The placeholders in the draft Protocol (e.g. where the working group stops short of spelling out what measures should be implemented) can be filled in, at least to some degree, by reference to the Guidelines.

Virtually all international arbitrations are currently managed, at least in part, through online digital communications.  As the digitisation of the arbitral process continues (with an increasing number of arbitrations being run in a ‘paperless’ way),institutional rules and guidance will need to keep up with this trend and ensure they address what cybersecurity measures are appropriate in each case and how responsibility will be allocated between stakeholders in the arbitral process to ensure that those measures are implemented.

The latest acknowledgment of this trendis found in the new Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) Rules due to enter into force on 1 November 2018, which spey icificallnclude as are cognised means of communications the upload “to any secured online repository that the parties have agreed to use” (Article 3.1(e) of the HKIAC Rules, accessed here). Other arbitral institutions are considering what changes might be needed to their rules, and provisions which seek to highlight and/or facilitate cybersecurity are expected to feature more prominently infuture versions.

Conclusion

All participants in arbitrations need to be aware of how they receive and store data, and of the technical complexities and costs associated with various cybersecurity measures. The proportionality of any given cybersecurity measure will depend on confidentiality requirements and the commercial sensitivity of the data, as well as the stakeholders’ individual data protection obligations (including, for instance, under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)). Awareness of the technological, organisational and procedural options available to increase cybersecurity wil lfacilitate a meaningful debate in many arbitrations cybersecurity measures that are required, and provide cogent grounds for tribunals to make an appropriate order where the parties disagree.

By Nicholas Peacock

                                                                                                            来源：微信公众号 临时仲裁ADA