英国商事法院判决：仲裁员私下咨询行业专家意见，构成“严重不合规”行为发回重审

一、案情介绍

2018年11月30日，英国商事法院就FLEETWOOD WANDERERS LIMITED诉AFC FYLDE LIMITED请求撤销仲裁裁决一案作出判决。判决请见：

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2018/3318.html

（一）案件背景

本案当事人FLEETWOOD WANDERERS LIMITED（以下简称“原告”）和AFC FYLDE LIMITED（以下简称“被告”）是英国的足球俱乐部，接受英格兰足球总会（FA）的管理。被告与一名职业足球运动员Dion Charles（以下简称“球员”）分别于2014年8月和2015年9月签订了劳动合同，然而在合同履行期间，该名球员又加入了原告所属的足球俱乐部，被告认为该名球员的行为构成根本违约，且原告错误地促使了此次违约的发生，应当赔偿其损失。于是，在2016年9月28日，被告依据《英格兰足球总会规则》（FA Rules）规则K将争议提交仲裁，Craig Moore被指定为仲裁员。在仲裁过程中，被告提出增加仲裁请求，即依据《国际足联球员身份及转会规定》（the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players）（以下简称“《规定》”）第17条规定请求原告赔偿损失。于2017年7月24日，仲裁员对涉案争议作出裁决。

（二）仲裁裁决结果

本案仲裁员认为，《英格兰足球总会规则》包含有《规定》的第17条规则。依据第17条规定，在没有正当理由的条件下终止合同的，应当赔偿对方损失；如果职业球员被要求赔偿损失，该球员与其所属俱乐部应当承担连带责任。故被告依据《规定》第17条主张的损害赔偿请求在本案得到支持。

（三）当事人申请撤销仲裁

      本案当事人FLEETWOOD WANDERERS LIMITED，即原告对仲裁裁决的结果表示不服，认为仲裁员在法律适用问题上和仲裁程序上均存在问题，于2017年8月21日向法院提起撤销仲裁裁决之诉。

二、争议焦点

（一）实体争议：《规定》第17条规定是否适用于本案

本案在实体问题上的主要争议在于，《英格兰足球总会规则》是否包含有《规定》第17条规定，即球员与其所属俱乐部对合同损失赔偿承担连带责任的规定是否适用于本案。

由于英格兰足球总会负责英格兰境内一切足球事务，而本案双方当事人都是英格兰境内的足球俱乐部，故无论是球员劳动合同格式文本，还是相关争议提交仲裁，都要受《英格兰足球总会规则》的规则调整。另一方面，作为国际足联的会员之一，英格兰足球总会受其规则约束，而本案争议的《规定》就属于国际足联重要规则之一。但是如何将该《规定》转化为会内规则，仍是有待论证的问题。根据《规定》第1.3（b）条规定，仅要求各足球协会制定适当的规则，且该义务的履行由其酌情考量；但是，也应当依据强制性规定和集体交涉协议，合理行使该义务，并要求考虑将第17条原则纳入会内规则体系中。

根据仲裁裁决，《英格兰足球总会规则》采纳了《规定》的全部规则，包括第17条规定。理由在于：依据《规定》第1.3（b）条的考量规则，《英格兰足球总会规则》中规则A和规则E可以合理解释为同时包含有《规定》的强制性规定和任意性规定，故《英格兰足球总会规则》当然包含有《规定》第17条规定。

法院认为，本案仲裁员在法律适用上存在错误。虽然规则A.1要求俱乐部在运营管理足球时要符合国际足联的规章制度，其中包括《规定》第1.3（b）条要求的强制性规定，但却难以推定英格兰足球总会为保护合同稳定性（Contractual stability）而依据《规定》第1.3（b）条采纳其第13至17条规定的原则。所以上述仲裁员的法律适用观点还有待进一步论证。

（二）程序瑕疵：仲裁是否违反《英国仲裁法》（the Arbitration Act 1996）

1.《英国仲裁法》第68（2）（a）条：仲裁员是否构成“严重不合规行为”

由于有充分证据证明本案仲裁员在仲裁过程中，擅自与英格兰足球总会工作人员就案件争议问题进行了邮件沟通，且在没有将沟通内容通知双方当事人并进行讨论的情况下做出了裁决，故本案原告主张仲裁员的行为违反了《英国仲裁法》（以下简称“《仲裁法》”）第33（1）条仲裁员职责的规定，构成第68（2）（a）条规定的“严重不合规行为”（Serious irregularity）。

法院认为，本案仲裁员的行为构成《仲裁法》第68（2）（a）条规定的“严重失职行为”。首先，由于在进行相关调查并收集信息时，仲裁员未与双方当事人分享该信息，且未给其机会做相关陈述，故仲裁员的行为违反了《仲裁法》第33条规定的相应职责，此种不规范操作构成第68（2）（a）条中的“不合规”。其次，如果将其调查资料向双方当事人公布，并给予其机会进行相关陈述，其最后很有可能会得出完全相反的结论，因而此种失职行为导致了“事实上的不公正”（Substantial injustice），构成第68（2）（a）条规定的“严重不合规行为”。

2.《英国仲裁法》第67条和第68（2）（b）条：仲裁庭是否具有管辖权或构成越权审理

根据《仲裁法》第67条和第68（2）（b）条，原告还主张仲裁庭对本案不具有管辖权或越权审理。法院认为，仲裁裁决是依据《英格兰足球总会规则》要求原告按照《规定》第17条进行赔偿的主张而做出的，符合其仲裁裁决范围；其次，根据《仲裁法》第73条规定，原告又未提前提出管辖权异议，因此无权再主张仲裁庭不具有管辖权，故不支持其此项主张。

三、法院判决

法院认为，本案应当发回重审。首先，根据《仲裁法》第68（3）条规定，法院不应撤销仲裁裁决或宣布仲裁裁决无效，除非将案件发回重审是不合适，法院应最低限度干涉仲裁程序；其次，仅就《规定》第17条的适用问题发回重新审理，可为当事人节省开支；再次，本案仲裁员的失职仅属于狭义范围，仲裁员可将与英格兰足球总会之间争议邮件的内容进行披露，再由双方当事人各自考量；最后，不存在任何证据显示本案仲裁员存在任何偏见，或质疑其专业能力，所以应当将本案发回重审。

【英文摘要】

FLEETWOOD WANDERERS LIMITED v AFC FYLDE LIMITED

(Claim No D40MA064)

 THE HIGH COURTOF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN MANCHESTER

CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT

30^thNovember 2018

The Award should be remitted to the Arbitrator to reconsider the case.

Background

1 This was a case of challenging an Arbitration Award (“the Award”) made by Craig Moore (“the Arbitrator”) arose by FLEETWOOD WANDERERS LIMITED (“the Claimant”) who was the Respondent of the arbitration against AFC FYLDE LIMITED (“the Defendant”) who was the Applicant of the Arbitration in respect of a dispute (“the Dispute”) emanating from the termination of a professional footballer’s contract of employment. The Defendant had commenced arbitration proceedings, pursuant to Rule K of the Football Association Rules (“FA rules”), against the Claimant, both of which were football clubs in England.

2 The Defendant’s complaint in the arbitration was that the Claimant had wrongfully procured the repudiatory breach committed by the professional football player Dion Charles (“the Player”) of his contractual obligation between him and Defendant,for which the Claimant was requested to compensate the caused damages of the Defendant according to Article 17 of the Regulation on the Status and Transfer of Player (“RSTP”), issued by the Federation Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”). The Arbitrator made an award in which he concluded that the Defendant had succeeded to establish its claim against the Claimant under Article 17. The Claimant then issued the present proceedings for challenging the Award before the court.

The material facts

3 On 5^th August 2014 and on 18^th September 2015, the Defendant entered into written contracts of employment with the Player without registering the second contract with the FA. But the Player rejoined the Claimant when contracted to the Defendant. The Defendant contended that the Player committed a repudiatory breach of his contractual obligations and the Claimant wrongfully procured the breach. On this hypothesis, the Defendant was furnished with a claim against the Claimant for damages at common law.

4 On 28^th September 2016, the Defendant referred the Dispute to arbitration under Rule K1 of the FA Rules. The Claimant and the Defendant were the only parties to the arbitration. During the arbitration, the Defendant amended its cases so as to add a claim for compensation based on Article 17 of RSTP of FIFA, in the light of which the Claimant was thus jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. On 24^th July 2017, the Award was made by the Arbitrator in which 24. The Arbitrator concluded that the FA Rules had incorporated the RSTP in full and approved the claim of the Defendant proposed under Article 17.

5 On 21^th August 2017, the Claimant issued the current proceedings and contended that the Arbitrator lacked “substantive jurisdiction” to make the Award under Section 67(1)(a) or had exceeded his powers within the meaning of Section 68(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996. And then it obtained permission to amend the claim that there existed a “serious irregularity” under Section 68(2)(a) of the 1996 owing to a breach of the Arbitrators statutory duties toact fairly and give the parties a reasonable opportunity to put their case after discovering an exchange of emails (“the Contentious Emails”) between the Arbitrator and the FA shortly before the Award.

The court’s decision

6 The Judge ultimately decided to remit the case to the Arbitrator to reconsider whether Article 17 applies and thus whether the Claimant’s claim under Article 17 succeeds by approving of the Claimant’s claim of the Arbitrator’s “serious irregularity” under Section 68(2)(a) and disapproved of the claim under Section  67(1)(a) or Section 68(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996.

7 As for the main issue whether FA Rules has incorporated Article 17 principles, which was not open to the Claimant to appeal, the Judge held a converse opinion that the Arbitrator’s conclusions on the Article 17 issue are incorrect in law. Although Article 1.3(b) imposed on the associations a discretionary obligation to make appropriate provision, this discretion must be exercised reasonably according respect to “mandatory national law and collective bargaining agreements” and taking into consideration the co-called “principles” in Article 17. However, the evidences could only show that the FAhad considered the provisions of the RSTP but finally had elected not to incorporate the principles in Article 17. Thus Article 17 has not been incorporated in FA Rules, which means the principle of the jointly andseverally liable should not apply to the present case, and there existed an error of law in the Award：at [15], [16], [19] and [20.2].

8 The Arbitrator’s conducts of the exchange of emails without disclosure the relevant information constituted a “serious irregularity” under Section 68(2)(a) of the 1996 Act. Firstly, it was evident that the Arbitrator has made inquiries and collected information about the arguable point of the application of Article 17 in current case without informing of and discussing with the parties, by doing which the Arbitrator has breached his general duties in Section 33, which constituted an “irregularity” under Section 68(2). Secondly, in consideration of the contents of the Contentious Emails, this irregularity was causative of “substantial injustice” in present case. Therefore, the Claimant succeeded in its claim under Section 68(2) of the 1992 Act. Contrarily, the Judge held that the alternative claims of Section 67 and 68(2)(B) were misconceived from the outset: at [32], [35], [39], [40] and [43].

9 The Judge held that the case should be remitted to the Arbitrator rather than be set aside or declared invalid for several reasons: firstly, according to Section 68(3), the Court must not set aside or declare the Award to be invalid unless satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit to theArbitrator for reconsideration, there was no reason for the Judge to make an opposite decision; secondly, it would be more economical for parties by remitting only the narrow Article 17; thirdly, the material irregularity in the present case is itself within a narrow compass; finally, there was no suggestion of bias on the part of the Arbitrator nor any good reason to challenge his professionalism: at [47].

by Chen Shuang

                                                                                                               来源：微信公众号 临时仲裁ADA