英国高等法院裁定仲裁事项的范围时采取“语境的广义解释”

英国高等法院在Bond v Mackay and others [2018] EWHC 2475 (TCC)一案中的裁定涉及这样一种情形，即当申请人请求向仲裁庭提出更多事由时，法庭需要确定这些事由是否属于提交仲裁庭的事项范围，属于其管辖范围之内。在评估这一问题时，法庭采取了“语境的广义解释”，认为第二项请求属于现有仲裁的实体管辖权范围。

事 实

这一争议最早产生于2011年，当时申请人通知第二和第三被申请人，打算就石油和天然气管道附近开采的矿物消毒问题提出赔偿请求。申请人的赔偿请求的依据是两项单独的协议：(1) 一份《BG契约》；和(2) 一份租约。BG契约规定三种仲裁制度：

1.第2条和第3条所引起的纠纷，由皇家特许测量师学会(RICS)主席同意或委任的独任仲裁员进行裁决；

2.第5条所引起的纠纷须由一名独任仲裁员裁定，该仲裁员须经当事人同意，无法达成一致时，则由土地法庭（现为高等法庭）裁定；及

3.第6条所引起的纠纷，须根据第5条所规定的同一仲裁制度来裁决。

2013年5月，申请人向第二和第三被申请人发出通知，表示打算根据《BG契约》第5条和第6条的规定提出赔偿请求，并选定一名仲裁员。2013年8月，RICS首席任命Mackay先生（第一被申请人）为仲裁员，尽管《BG契约》规定，根据第5条和第6条提出申请的仲裁员应由当事人协商一致任命，或者，如果无法达成一致，则应由高等法庭（Upper Tribunal）任命。第二和第三被申请人最初对仲裁员的任命和管辖权提出异议，但随后参加仲裁，没有对这一立场提出任何保留。

该仲裁员在2015年7月作出裁决驳回这些请求，但申请人成功地向高等法院提出了上诉。

2017年，在成功对驳回其请求的裁决提出上诉后，申请人写信给第二和第三被申请人，向他们通报了根据《BG契约》第2(i)条可能发生的争议，并声称第三被申请人违反了该条款（“第2(i)条 争议”）。申请人没有收到任何答复，因此2017年5月请求任命Mackay先生为第2(i)条争端的仲裁员。申请人还请求将第2(i)条争议与目前正在进行的其他问题的仲裁结合起来，理由是该争议属于仲裁的范围，而且“实际上只有一项争议”。

仲裁员的第二份裁决于2018年2月送达各方当事人，随后于2018年3月进行了补正。他不同意申请人的主张，认为第2(i)条争议不在目前仲裁最初提及的范围之内。申请人根据1996年《仲裁法》第67条对此提出质疑（该条允许在仲裁地为英国的仲裁中，对仲裁庭关于其实体管辖权的裁决提出异议）。

高等法院的裁定

Davis QC(作为高等法院副法官)不同意仲裁员的裁定，即第2(i)条的争议不在最初提及的仲裁范围之内。法庭指出，仲裁员裁决背后的原因难以理解，法庭基本上是在重新审理管辖权问题。在这方面，主要问题似乎是，根据第2(i)条提出的争议是否不在提交仲裁员的事项范围之内，因为仲裁最初是根据《BG契约》不同条款引起的争议进行的。法官不同意这种做法。相反，他认为，法庭在确定所提及的事项时，应当采取“语境的广义解释”，包括更广泛的事实背景，例如在指定仲裁员和接受指定之前的信函。

在这种情况下，法官接受了申请人的论点，即提交仲裁员的事项被正确地视为“赔偿”请求，“无论根据第2(i)条、第5或第6条”。[58].  因此，对第2(i)条违反的事实没有从一开始就提及，并不意味着它不在仲裁员的管辖范围之内。

评 论

在Bond诉Mackay案中，法庭采取了一种比较宽松的做法，以确定哪些事项已提交仲裁，而不是让自己受到所请求事项特殊性的约束。这是一种有效做法（认识到本案存在着单一争端（索赔请求），可以在单一仲裁中更为有效地解决），但也需要结合具体情况来看待。法官指出，这不是这种情形，例如根据机构规则要求作出的审理范围书，提交仲裁庭的事项在仲裁早期阶段已经确定和协商一致，这样可能没有采取这种做法的自主权（或需要）。

[英文部分]

English High Courttakes a “broad view of the factual matrix” in deciding scope of mattersreferred to arbitration

By Sadie Buls; Stephen Lacey

The English High Court decision of Bond v Mackay and others [2018] EWHC 2475 (TCC) concerned a situation where, when a claimant sought to bring further issues before an arbitral tribunal, the court was asked to determine whether those issues fell within the scope of the matters referred to the arbitrator and therefore within his jurisdiction. In assessing this, the court took a “broad view ofthe factual matrix”, finding that the second claim fell within the substantive jurisdiction of the existing arbitration.

Facts

The dispute first arose in 2011, when the claimant notified the second and third defendants of its intention to claim compensation with respect to the sterilization of minerals extracted near oil and gas pipelines. The claimant sought compensation under two separate agreements: (i) a BG Deed and (ii) a lease.  There were three arbitral regimes in the BG Deed:

1. disputes arising under clauses 2 and 3 were to be determined by a single arbitrator to be agreed or appointed by the President of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS);

2. disputes arising under clause 5 were to be determined by a single arbitrator to be agreed by the parties, and in the default of such agreement, by the Lands Tribunal (now the Upper Tribunal); and

3. disputes arising under clause 6 were to be determined in accordance with the same arbitral regime under clause 5.

In May 2013 the claimant gave notice to the second and third defendants of its intention to appoint an arbitrator in relation to compensation claims under clauses 5 and 6 of the BG Deed. In August 2013, the President of RICS appointed Mr Mackay (the first defendant) as arbitrator, despite the BG Deed providing that an arbitrator for claims under clause 5 and 6 should be agreed by the parties or,in the absence of such an agreement, by the Upper Tribunal. The second and third defendants initially objected to the arbitrator’s appointment and jurisdiction, but subsequently participated in the arbitration without any reservation of that position. 

The arbitrator dismissed the claims in an award issued in July 2015 but the claimant appealed successfully to the High Court.  The contents of the court order were not relevant to the latest challenge.

Having successfully appealed the dismissal of its claims, in 2017, the claimant wrote to the second and third defendants, notifying them of a potential dispute under clause 2(i) of the BG Deed and claiming that the third defendant had breached that clause (the “Clause 2(i) Dispute”).  The claimant received no response and so in May 2017 requested that Mr Mackay be appointed as arbitrator for the Clause 2(i) Dispute. The claimant also requested that the Clause 2(i) Dispute be joined with the current, ongoing arbitration of the other issues, its case being that it was within the ambit of that arbitration and that “there is in effect only one dispute”. 

The arbitrator’s second award was delivered to the parties in February 2018, and then amended in March 2018. He disagreed with the claimant’s position and found that the Clause 2(i) Dispute was not within the scope of the initial reference of the ongoing arbitration. The claimant challenged this under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (which permits, in an arbitration with seat in England, a challenge to the tribunal’s award as to its substantive jurisdiction).

The High Court’s decision

Davis QC (sitting as Deputy High Court judge) disagreed with the arbitrator’s finding that the Clause 2(i) Dispute was not within the initial reference to arbitration. The court noted that the reasons behind the arbitrator’s award were difficult to follow and that the court was essentially rehearing the matter of jurisdiction.In this respect the principal issue appeared to be whether a dispute under clause 2(i) was outside the matters referred to the arbitrator because the arbitration had initially proceeded on the basis of disputes under different clauses of the BG Deed. The judge disagreed with such an approach. He instead found that the court should take a “broad view of the factual matrix” indetermining what had been referred, including the wider factual background such as correspondence leading up to the appointment of the arbitrator and the acceptance of the appointment. 

Against that context,the judge accepted the claimant’s argument that the matter referred to the arbitrator was correctly seen as a claim for “compensation”, “whether that be under Clause 2(i), 5 or 6” [58].  Thus, the fact that a breach of clause 2(i) was not initially referred to from the outset did not mean that it was outside the arbitrator’s jurisdiction

Comment

In Bond v Mackay the court took a somewhat liberal approach to determine which matters had been referred to arbitration, looking at the situation in the round rather than allowing itself to be tied down by the particularities of what is pleaded. Thisis a practical approach (in recognising that there was a single dispute in this case (the claim for compensation) which could be more efficiently resolved in a single arbitration), although it also needs to be seen in context. The judge noted that this was not a situation where, for example, terms of reference were required under institutional rules, so in circumstances where the matters to be referred to the tribunal have been defined and agreed upon at an early stage,there may not be the latitude (or the need) for such an approach.

Read the full judgment here.

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