UNCITRAL报告：投资者与国家争端解决改革必要性--仲裁员和决策者
投资者与国家争端解决改革必要性
仲裁员和决策者--指定机制及其相关问题
Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS)
Arbitrators and decision makers: appointment mechanisms and related issues
I. Introduction
引言
1. For the information of the Working Group, document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.151 addresses the question of independence and impartiality of arbitrators and this Note addresses the related questions of the impact of arbitrator appointment mechanisms and desirability of reforms. This Note addresses the topic of desirability of reforms regarding arbitrators and decision makers ininvestor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) on the basis of the issues set out in both documents.
1. 工作组的A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.151号文件涉及仲裁员的公正性和独立性问题，本说明将讨论与仲裁员委任机制的影响和改革的意愿有关的问题。本说明基于两份文件所载议项，讨论了关于在投资者-东道国争端解决中对仲裁员和决策者进行改革意愿的议题。
2. At its 35th session, the Working Group suggested that information on other legal frameworks on appointment mechanisms should be made available to the Working Group, in particular addressing international commercial arbitration and international courts and tribunals (A/CN.9/935, para. 46). This note includes information regarding these “comparators” and provides commentary on the relevance and reliability of information and data on individual issues,where appropriate.
2. 工作组在第35届会议上提议，其他法律框架中有关委任机制的信息应当提供给工作组，特别是涉及国际商事仲裁、国际法院和仲裁庭的信息（A/CN.9/935,第46段），本说明包含关于这些“比较”方面的信息并在适当时对个别问题的信息和数据的关联性和可靠性提出评价。
3. As is the case for other documents provided to the Working Group, this Note was prepared withreference to a broad range of published information on the topic.
3．与提供给工作组的其他文件的情况一样，本说明参照大量的关于该议题的已公布信息而编写。
4. While this Note provides information to assist the Working Group in its ,consideration of certain concerns in ISDS and the desirability of reforms, it does not seek to express a view on the issues raised, which is a matter for the Working Group to consider.
4. 虽然本说明提供了一些信息以协助工作组审议ISDS中的某些关切事项以及改革的可取性，但它并未试图就所提出的问题表达意见，这是工作组需要考虑的问题。
II. Appointment mechanisms and related issues
委任机制及相关问题
1. Assessment of identified concerns
已识别问题的评估
5. In the current ISDS regime, appointment of arbitrators and decisions makers is most commonly made by the disputing parties and to a much lesser extent by appointing authorities, including arbitral institutions, tasked with assisting in the process. The fragmented nature of the ISDS regime therefore does not provide for a uniform process. How the tribunal will be composed, and the individual arbitrators selected, are governed by the applicable governing treaty provisions or specific contractual provisions and, if none, under the default rules of any relevant arbitral institution (such as those of ICSID) or the applicable ad hoc rules (such as those of UNCITRAL).
5. 在当前ISDS制度中，仲裁员和决策者通常由争端当事人指定，很少由委任机构（包括负责在程序中给予协助的仲裁机构）委任。因此，ISDS制度的离散性（fragmented nature）并未提供一套统一的程序。仲裁庭如何组成，仲裁员如何指定，均由适用的条约条款或具体合同条款调整，如果没有此种条款，则适用任何相关仲裁机构的默认规则（如ICSID的规则）或可适用的临时规则（如UNCITRAL的规则）。
(a) Appointment of arbitrators in ISDS
ISDS仲裁员的指定
Party appointment
当事人指定
6. The ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules have similar approaches to the process of appointment of arbitrators. They provide for a default three -party tribunal, with the parties each appointing one arbitrator (these two arbitrators are commonly referred to as the “co-arbitrators”). The co-arbitrators (UNCITRAL) or the parties(ICSID) themselves then appoint the presiding arbitrator by agreement. Very few investment treaties address the appointment mechanisms, though some recent bilateral treaties have included developments as compared with what can be termed more “traditional”approaches.
6. 《ICSID规则》和《UNCITRAL规则》在仲裁员指定程序方面采取了类似做法，二者均规定默认组成三人仲裁庭，即双方当事人各指定一名仲裁员（这两名仲裁员通常被称为“共同仲裁员”）。然后，UNCITRA的共同仲裁员或 ICSID的当事人根据协议指定首席仲裁员。尽管最近的一些双边条约与更“传统”的做法相比有些改进，但很少有投资条约涉及委任机制问题。
7. Arbitral rules do not set out a process that a party must follow in identifying and appointing an arbitrator. The parties are free to select any person to serve as an arbitrator provided that s/he meets the applicable criteria. The party engaged in the selection of a potential arbitrator will investigate qualifications and background. Such investigations, which sometimes include a limited interview,cover whether and where s/he has acted as arbitrator or counsel in ISDS cases,has advised the parties or related parties, issued publications and statements,and seek to gain insight into personality, reputation, technical skills,language abilities and approach to the arbitral process in general.
7. 仲裁规则没有规定一方在识别和指定仲裁员时必须遵循的程序。双方可自由选择任何符合适用标准的人员担任仲裁员。参与选择候选仲裁员的一方要调查他们的资历和背景。这种调查有时包括有限的访谈，内容涉及候选人是否曾在ISDS案件中担任过仲裁员或律师，是否曾给当事人或者相关方提过建议，是否发表过刊物和言论，并试图对候选人的性格、声誉、专业技能、语言能力和仲裁程序有大致的了解。
8.Guidelines designed to protect the integrity of the process and independence and impartiality of the potential arbitrator where interviews are conducted provide, among other things, that the interview should not seek to identify the potential arbitrator’s views on the substance of the case.
8. 为访谈制定指引的目的在于保护程序的完整性以及潜在仲裁员的独立性和公正性。除其他事项外，该指引规定，进行访谈时不得询问潜在仲裁员对案件实质内容的看法。
9.In the context of ISDS, where a State is involved, and the issues at stake usually invoke issues of public interest, concerns have been raised regarding the appointment of arbitrators by the parties (A/CN.9/935, para. 54).
9. 在ISDS背景下，案件一方当事人是国家，通常就会涉及公共利益的问题，就有关于仲裁员指定的问题 (A/CN.9/935, para.54)。
Appointment by appointing authorities
委任机构指定
10. The Working Groupmay wish to note that the Rules of ICSID and UNCITRAL foresee the intervention of an appointing authority to assist the parties in the appointment process.
10. 工作组不妨注意到，《ISID规则》和《UNCITRAL规则》都预先规定了在委任程序中由委任机构介入来协助当事人。
11. The method of appointment itself and the shortlisting of appointed arbitrators on individual cases are governed by legal requirements and established practice to allow fora timely appointment of competent arbitrators when the parties or the co-arbitrators fail to do so. In practice, a list procedure (or ballot procedure) is a well-established practice. A shortlist is composed of qualified arbitrators selected by the appointing authority (depending on the circumstances of the case and taking into account the legal requirement such asnationality or impartiality), on an informal basis and sometimes after consultation with the parties.
11. 指定方法本身以及在个案中指定的仲裁员都要受法律要求和惯例的约束，以便在当事各方或共同仲裁员未能及时指定合格仲裁员时，能够及时指定合格仲裁员。在实践中，列表程序（或投票程序）是一项完善的实践。候选名单由委任机构基于非正式方式选择的适格仲裁员组成（根据案件的实际情况并考虑国籍、公正性等方面的法律要求），有时也会与当事人进行协商。
12.Regarding appointment by an appointing authority, the main concern raised relates to the lack of transparency in the appointment process, as emphasized in the recent work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the matter.7 Transparency in the appointment of arbitrators by appointing authorities may be considered at two stages: first, regarding the preparation and disclosure of lists (or pools) of proposed arbitrators and the process of selection for a particular case; and second, the disclosure of appointment activity by appointing authorities in ISDS.
12. 正如OECD在最近工作中所强调，关于委任机构指定的首要问题是指定过程缺乏透明度。委任机构指定仲裁员的透明度可分为两个阶段：第一，关于拟任仲裁员名单（或名单）的编制和公布，以及对某一特定案件的选择过程；第二，ISDS委任机构披露委任活动。
13. The Working Groupmay wish to recall that the appointment process in ISDS, relying mainly onparty-appointment and only at the margin on appointing authorities (see figuresat paras. 11 and 44 of A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.146), has relatively recently been the subject of detailed scrutiny. Moreover, as noted above, arbitrators must fulfil certain requirements (nationality, experience) and failing to do so could trigger a challenge to that arbitrator by the opposing party, which is asituation that appointing authorities seek to avoid (see, in particular, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) submission in A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.146, para.58).
13. 工作组不妨回顾，ISDS的指定程序大部分依赖于当事人指定，只有小部分由委任机构指定，（数据详见A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.146号文件，第11和44段），这也是最近详细审查的对象。此外，如上所述，仲裁员必须满足某些条件（国籍、经验），如果不满足这些要求，对方当事人可能申请仲裁员回避，这是委托机构力图避免的情况（尤见常设仲裁法院（PCA）在 A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.146号文件第58段的意见）。
14. As for the disclosure of appointment activity by appointing authorities, very little information is publicly available. It may be noted that arbitral institutions have recently taken measures in order to address the criticism of lack of transparency. In particular, some of the main institutions have allowed for more systematic disclosure about the appointment and the composition of arbitration tribunals.
14. 至于委任机构公告的委任活动，公众可知的信息很少。值得注意的是，最近仲裁机构采取了一些措施，以解决对缺乏透明度的质疑。尤其是，一些主要机构已经允许更系统地披露仲裁庭的指定和组成。
Comparison withother adjudicatory systems
与其他审判制度的比较
15. The Working Group may wish to note that the appointment mechanisms in ISDS are comparable to appointment mechanisms in commercial arbitration and State-to-State arbitration. They are, however, very different from the mechanisms regarding the appointment of adjudicators in international bodies, where a distinction should be made between selection of adjudicators to become a member of an adjudicative body and assignment of a specific case among adjudicators or to chambers,and from common methods for judicial appointments at the national level.
15. 工作组不妨注意到ISDS的指定机制可以与商事仲裁和国家间仲裁的指定机制相比较。但他们与国际组织指定裁决者的机制大不相同，前者是选择裁决者成为裁决机构的一员，而后者则将特定案件指派给裁决者或事物所（chamber）。同时，他们也不同于国家层面的常见司法指定方式。
16. As regards the appointment of international judges, States nominate candidates for international judicial office in an election or appointment process that is similar across many international courts and tribunals, albeit with some variations. The process is typically transparent in that it is set out in the relevant statutes or rules. In some cases, a State may appoint a single candidate, or member States as a group may put forward a limited number of candidates, and the candidates as a whole then Under go an election process.For example, in the case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the General Assembly and Security Council make the appointments (fifteen judges in total), and in the case of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe elects one of three candidates for each seat (with 41 judges in total). The nomination process involves formal and informal meetings between candidates and permanent representatives of member States.
16. 关于国际法官的指定，各国在国际司法办公室选任或指定程序中推荐候选人，这和许多国际法院和国际仲裁庭的程序相似，虽然尚有些许不同。因为它规定在相关法规或规则中，这一过程通常是透明的。在有些情况下，一个国家可以指定一名候选人，或各成员国作为一个整体可以提名少数几位候选人，然后候选人作为一个整体经过一个选举流程。例如，就国际法院（ICJ）而言，由联合国大会和安理会作出指定（总共15个大法官），而就欧洲人权法院而言（ECHR），每个职位候选人的三分之一由欧洲委员会的议会选举（总共41个大法官）。提名程序涉及候选人和会员国常驻代表之间的正式和非正式面谈。
17. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal broadly follows the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but has modified the appointment process as follows. Each of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America appoints three judges, and a list procedure is used to appoint the three remaining judges. Where the list procedure fails, or the Appointing Authority is otherwise required to appoint the judges, it is under an obligation under article 6.4 of the Tribunal Rules to “secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator”.
17. 伊朗-美国索赔法庭大体上遵循《UNCITRAL仲裁规则》，但对指定程序作出如下修改。伊朗伊斯兰共和国和美利坚合众国各指定三名法官，然后采用列表程序指定其余三名法官。如果列表程序未能指定出其余三名法官，或者委任机构被要求进行委任，根据《仲裁庭规则》第6.4条的规定，它有义务“确保指定一名独立和公正的仲裁员”。
18. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) addresses appointments to the Appellate Body of WTO. It provides that consensus among WTO members is required for appointment (or re-appointment) of seven members to the body (which sits in three-member panels). There has also been a practice of automaticre-appointment, other than in cases of infirmity, performance concerns or misconduct, though lack of consensus recently has led to some seats remaining vacant.
18.《世界贸易组织（WTO）争端解决谅解（DSU）》提及 WTO上诉机构成员的委任。其中规定，指定（或重新指定）七名成员进入该机构（现有三名成员）需要WTO成员国的一致同意。此外，还实行了自动重新委任的做法，尽管没有存在能力不足、表现不当或行为不检的情况下，但是最近因缺乏共识而导致了一些空缺。
C Impact of the selection process on diversity and competence
选择程序对多样性和能力的影响
Diversity
多样性
19.The Working Groupmay wish to consider the impact of the appointment mechanisms on the question of diversity of appointed arbitrators in ISDS.
19．工作组不妨审议指定机制对ISDS指定仲裁员多样性问题的影响。
20. At the 35th session, there was a broad view in the Working Group that there was a limited number of individuals that were repeatedly appointed as arbitrators, and consequently that were repeatedly taking decisions, in ISDS cases. The Working Group has also noted a lack of diversity in terms of gender, geographical distribution, ethnicity and age (A/CN.9/935, para. 70).
20. 工作组在第35届会议上普遍认为，在ISDS案件中，只有数量有限的人员被重复指定为仲裁员，因此重复作出裁决。工作组还注意到仲裁员在性别、地理分布、种族和年龄方面缺乏多样性（A/CN.9/935，第70段）。
21. In addition, the Working Group has noted the following potential impacts of a lack of diversity in arbitrator appointment: a lack of arbitrators that underst and the policy considerations in developing countries; possible negative impacts on correctness of decisions made; concerns at perceptions of a lack of impartiality and independence on the part of arbitrators (A/CN.9/935, para. 70)
21. 此外，工作组也注意到仲裁员指定缺乏多样性可能造成以下潜在影响：缺少了解发展中国家政策考虑的仲裁员；可能对正确决策产生负面影响；引发对仲裁员缺乏公正性和独立性的担忧（A/CN.9/935, 第70段）。
22. The Working Groupmay also wish to consider whether diversity is a desirable quality in itself.Respondents to a recent survey indicated that they had lost appointments as arbitrators because of diversity factors.
22. 工作组也不妨考虑多样性本身是否是一种可取的考量。最近一项调查的受访者表示，由于多样性因素，他们丧失了成为仲裁员的机会。
23. The Working Grouphas also noted that repeated appointments might raise problems of arbitrator availability and increased costs and duration of proceedings, and that addressing diversity might contribute to resolving concerns about conflicts ofinterest (A/CN.9/935, para. 71).
23. 工作组已经注意到，重复指定可能引起有关仲裁员便利性的问题，并增加程序费用和时间，解决多样性问题可能有助于解决利益冲突问题（A/CN.9/935，第71段）。
24. Regarding gender diversity, the proportion of female arbitrators in investment treaty tribunals has been regularly surveyed in a variety of publications, though the data are not all fully comparable. In broad terms, a detailed study in 2006 of the then 102 publicly-available awards concluded that 5 out of 145 arbitrators were women(approximately 3 per cent). As of 1 March 2012, based on the 254 “concluded cases” from 1972-2012 published on the ICSID website, it was concluded that 43 out of 745 arbitrators were women (5.63 per cent). A similar analysis by the SCC in 2015 found that 39 out of 279 appointments were women. By comparison, a 2011 analysis for institutional appointments in international arbitration more generally (ISDSand international commercial arbitration) found that an estimated 6 per cent of arbitrators were women, increasing to 17 per cent by 2016. However, it has also been suggested that in terms of the number of appointments as international arbitrators, there is no significant difference in the number of appointments women and men obtained. Various surveys also indicate that arbitral institutions are much more willing to appoint female arbitrators than the parties are.
24. 关于性别多样性，各种出版物定期调查了投资条约法庭中女性仲裁员的比例，尽管这些数据并不完全可比。大致来说，2006年的一份关于102项公开裁决的详细研究显示，145名仲裁员中有5名是女性（约3%）。截至2012年3月1日，根据ICSID网站上发表的1972-2012年254个“结案案例”，在745名仲裁员中，有43名是女性（5.63%）。SCC在2015年进行的一项类似分析发现，279次委任中有39名是女性。相比之下，2011年的一项关于国际仲裁（ISDS和国际商事仲裁）中机构委任的分析更普遍地认为，估计有6%的仲裁员是女性，到2016年将增加至17%。然而，也有人表示，就指定国际仲裁员的数量而言，指定男性和女性的数量没有显著差异。各种调查还表明，仲裁机构比当事人更愿意指定女仲裁员。
25. International courts and tribunals have also received criticism for a lack of female judges.While the statutes of the ICJ and ITLOS do not refer to gender diversity, the more recent ICC Statute,in contrast, requires the States Parties to take into account “a fair representation of female and male judges”. Commentators report higher gender parity in the ICC, and in criminal and human rights courts more generally, than in other bodies. As at the time of writing, there is a greater representation of female judges at the ICC(7/18) than on either ITLOS (3/21) or the ICJ(3/15).
25. 国际法院和法庭也因缺少女法官而受到诟病。虽然国际法院（ICJ）和国际海洋法法庭（ITLOS）没有规定性别多样性，但相比之下，最新的《ICC规约》要求缔约国考虑“女性和男性法官的均衡比例”。评论人士称，与其他机构相比，ICC和刑事与人权法庭的性别平等程度更高。截至发稿时，ICC中女法官的比例（7/18）高于ITLOS（3/21）和 ICJ（3/15）。
26. In terms of repeated appointments of a limited number of arbitrators, of the 372 individuals appointed to ICSID tribunals from 1972 until 2011, 37 were appointed to around 50 per cent of the cases, and approximately one third had background education from only five universities. ICSID reported that, in 289 cases from January 1972 to May 2015, in nearly half of cases (45 per cent), the tribunals were composedof all Anglo-European arbitrators. Analysis of case data indicates that, in 84 per cent of the cases, two or more of the tribunal members were Anglo-European, or the sole arbitrator was Anglo-European; and 11 cases (4 per cent) were arbitrated by entirely non Anglo-European tribunals. More generally,studies indicate that arbitrators from the developing world received a statistically lower number of appointments than their developed world counterparts.
26. 就被重复指定的有限仲裁员而言，从1972年至2011年间，被指定为ICSID仲裁庭的372名人员中，有37人被指定为担任大约50%案件的仲裁员，约三分之一的仲裁员有五所大学的背景教育。ICSID报告称，在1972年1月至2015年5月的289个案件中，将近一半案件（45%）的仲裁庭都由英欧仲裁员组成。对案件数据的分析表明，在84%的案件中，仲裁庭的两名或两名以上成员为盎格鲁-欧洲人，或独任仲裁员为盎格鲁-欧洲人；只有11个案件中（4%）完全没有英欧仲裁员参与仲裁。更普遍的是，研究表明，来自发展中国家的仲裁员的指定数量低于来自发达国家的仲裁员的指定数量。
27. The Working Group may also wish to note that arbitral institutions report that they are taking measures to expand the pool of arbitrators (A/CN.9/935, paras. 71–72).For instance,ICSID reported in 2017 on its efforts to increase diversity as follows:
“An increasingly diverse group of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc committee members were named in 2017: 13 per cent of these appointments involved persons who served for the first time on an ICSID tribunal or ad hoc committee; 23 per cent of the first-time appointees were nationals of low or middle income economies, and 14per cent of the new appointees were women. Overall, 93 individuals from 33 different countries of origin were appointed to serve as arbitrators,conciliators, or ad hoc committee members in 57 ICSID cases in 2017; 14 percent of the total number of appointments in 2017 involved women. ICSID and the Respondent/State each appointed 43.5 per cent of these female appointees, while 13 per cent of female appointments were made jointly by the parties in the underlying arbitration. No female appointments were made by the Claimant/investor individually or by the co-arbitrators.” Acting asappointing authority 47 times in 2017, ICSID appointed 31 individuals of 25 different nationalities. About 23 per cent of the appointments by ICSID involved nationals of low or middle-income economies, and 21 per cent of ICSID appointees were women.”
27．工作组还应注意到，仲裁机构报告称，它们正在采取措施扩大仲裁员人数。（A/CN.9/935, 第71-72段）。例如，ICSID在2017年报告其在增加多样性方面所作的如下努力：“2017年，仲裁员、调解员和临时委员会成员的组成日益多样化；其中被ICSID仲裁庭或临时委员会首次指定的人员占13%；首次被指定的人中来自中低收入国家的占23%，首次被指定的人中女性占14%。总体而言，在2017年，总共有来自33个不同原籍国的93人被指定为57个ICSID案件的仲裁员、调解员或临时委员会成员；在2017年的所有指定者中，女性占比14%。ICSID和被申请人/国家各自指定这些女性的占比达到43.5%，而其中13%被指定的女性是由双方在基础仲裁中共同指定。申请人或投资者个人或共同仲裁员均未指定女性人员。2017年，ICSID作为委任机构委任了47次，ICSID指定了来自25个不同国家的31人，其中来自低收入或中等收入经济国民占比约为23%，其中被指定的女性占比约为21%。
28. By way of comparison, the ICJ Statute does not permit two judges from the same State among the fifteen judges appointed to the Court, and the entire bench is to represent geographical diversity and the world’s principal legal systems.
28. 相比之下，《ICJ规约》禁止被指定的15名法官中有两名来自同一州的法官，而整个法官队伍将代表不同的地理区域和世界主要法律制度。
29. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has the same requirements. Historically, the five permanent members of the Security Council have Maintained a judge on the ICJ of their own nationality. The remaining ten judges comprise two from each of the United Nations regional groups. The WTO Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU) provides that WTO DSU membership as a whole shall be “broadlyrepresentative of membership of the WTO”
29，国际海洋法法庭（ITLOS）也有相同规定。安全理事会的五个常任理事国历来维护具有本国国籍的国际法院法官。其余10名法官分别来自联合国各区域集团。《世界贸易组织（WTO）关于争端解决规则和程序的谅解（DSU）》规定，WTO DSU成员作为一个整体应当“广泛代表WTO成员 ”.
Competence, arbitrators’ qualifications
仲裁员的任职资格、能力
30. The Working Group considered the question of arbitrators’qualifications atits 35th session (A/CN.9/935, paras. 82–88). It was recalled that party-appointment provided the parties with the right to select arbitrators on the basis of their consideration of the desired qualifications and experience, though they did not have the same control over those of the presiding arbitrator (A/CN.9/935, para. 83).
30. 工作组在其第35次会议上审议了仲裁员的任职资格问题（A/CN.9/935，第82-88段）。据回顾，当事人指定仲裁员使得使当事人有权根据其所需的任职资格和经验来选择仲裁员，尽管当事人对选择首席仲裁员不能进行同样的控制。
31. It was generally noted that the qualifications of arbitrators or decision makers in ISDS cases should include an ability to take into account relevant issues of public interest or public policy, which were usually at stake in ISDS cases. It was said that ISDS cases could require expertise in matters of both public and private international law, and also that arbitrators might be called upon to make findings on matters of domestic law (A/CN.9/935, para. 83). The issue of whether arbitrators are adequately cognizant of public interest issues also relate to technical rules of procedure and evidence. For instance, rules ofevidence regarding what documents are or are not privileged, or what evidenceis or is not admissible, often reflect important public policies. When arbitrators do not follow those rules in arbitral proceedings, there are policy implications and may be implications for the outcomes of proceedings.
31. 一般来说，在ISDS案件中，仲裁员或裁决决策者的任职资格包括：将涉及公共利益或公共政策的相关问题考虑在内的能力，这些问题在ISDS案件中通常是利害攸关的。有人表示，ISDS案件可能需要国际公法和国际私法方面的专门知识，也可能需要仲裁员就国内法方面的问题作出裁决（A/CN.9/935，第83段）。仲裁员是否对公共利益问题有充分的认知，该问题也与程序和证据的技术规则有关。例如，关于哪些文件是否具有优先性，或哪些证据是否可以采纳的证据规则往往反映了重要的公共政策。如果仲裁员在仲裁程序中不遵守这些规则，就会产生政策影响，并可能对程序的结果产生影响。
32. The ICSID Convention, in the context of the individual requirements for designation tothe ICSID Panels of Arbitrators and Conciliators by the Contracting States and the Chairman of the Administrative Council, requires that “[p]ersons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of […] recognized competence in the fields of law,commerce, industry or finance”. It further specifies that“[c]ompetence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of Arbitrators” (article 14(1) ICSID Convention)
32. 《ICSID公约》就缔约国和行政理事会主席指定在ICSID仲裁员和调解员名册中的人员，要求“指定在名册服务的人员应……在法律、商务、工业和金融方面有公认的能力”，并进一步规定，“对仲裁员名册的人员而言，在法律方面的能力尤其重要。”（《ICSID公约》第14(1)条）
33. By way of comparison, a number of statutes of international courts and tribunals follow the model of Article 2 of the ICJ Statute, which essentially envisages two alternative professional profiles: judges are to be elected fromamong individuals eligible for appointment to a“high” or “the highest” judicial offices in their respective countries. As second alternative of eligible judges, the statutes of ICJ and other international judicial bodies mention “jurisconsults”, which in essence refers to scholars and academics. In some cases, statutes simply require individuals to be jurists of “recognized competence” without indication of a specific legal area. So for instance at ICJ, judges need to be of recognized competence in “international law”. For judges appointed on specialized courts, however, the subject-matter jurisdiction may call for more specific qualifications.
33. 相比之下，大量的国际法院和法庭的规约都遵循《ICJ规约》第2条的模型，其本质上是两个可选的专业简介：从各国“高级”或“最高”司法机关任命的符合任职条件的个人中挑选法官。作为适格法官的第二种选择，ICJ和其他国际司法机构的规约提到“法学专家”，其实质是指学者和专业学者。在某些情况下，规约只要求个人为“具有公认能力”的法学家，而未指明具体的法律领域。因此，例如在ICJ，法官需要在“国际法”方面具有公认能力。但是，对于在专门法庭任职的法官而言，属事管辖权（subject-matterjurisdiction）可能要求其符合特定任职资格。
34. The Statute of ICC envisages an Advisory Committee to review nominations to assess whether the relevant appointment criteria have been met. It was put into effect in 2015 (at which time nine members were appointed for a three-year term). A similar advisory panel of experts has been set up at the ECHR.
34.《ICC规约》拟构建一个咨询委员会来审查提名名单，以此评估是否符合有关的任用标准。它已于2015年生效（当时任命了9名成员，任期3年）。ECHR也设立了一个类似的专家顾问团。
35. The Working Group may also wish to note that appointing parties provided the following feedback on arbitrator appointments a recent survey:
• Seventy per cent of respondents stated that they have access to enough information to make an informed choice about the appointment of arbitrators
• Respondents would like to have access to arbitrators’previous awards, know more about their approach to procedural and substantive issues and have a clear picture of their availability to take on new cases
• Eighty percent of respondents would like to beable to provide an assessment of arbitrators at the end of a dispute. Nearly 90 per cent would do so by reporting to an arbitral institution.
35. 工作组不妨注意到，作出指定的当事人在最近的一项关于仲裁员指定的调查中提供了如下反馈：
•70%的受访者表示，他们可以获得足够信息，就仲裁员的指定作出明智的选择。
•受访者希望能够获悉仲裁员之前作出的裁决，了解更多关于他们处理程序和实体问题的方法，并希望对其处理新案件的能力有清晰的认知。
•80%的受访者希望能够在争端结束时对仲裁员进行评价，近90%的人会向仲裁机构就此作出报告。
36. It was generally agreed in the Working Group that qualifications of the decision makers were important, and should bekept in mind by the Working Group, but that that particular point would not deserve the development of a specific tool (A/CN.9/935,para. 88).
36. 工作组一致认为决策者的任职资格非常重要，工作组应当牢记，但在这一点上无需制定特定工具（A/CN.9/935，第88段）。
Desirability of reform
改革的意愿
1. Reform objectives
改革目标
37. At the 35th session of the Working Group, it was mentioned that the desirability of reform should be considered also taking into account the following matters:
37. 在工作组第35次会议上，有人提到改革可取性也需要考虑到以下几个问题：
• That the benefits of the current system, such as its flexibility and neutrality, should be preserved;
现行制度的优点，例如灵活性和中立性，应该得到保留；
• That the interestsof all stakeholders in ISDS should be considered and that any solutions should ensure a balance of interests of stakeholders;
应考虑到ISDS中所有利益相关者的利益，任何解决方案都应确保利益相关者的利益平衡；
• That any solutions should avoid politicization, since the de-politicization of
ISDS was a primary benefit of the current system (A/CN.9/935, para. 63)
任何解决方案都应避免政治化，因为非政治化是ISDS当前系统的主要优点之一(A/CN.9/935，第63段)
38. The Working Group may also wish to consider the desirability of taking into account potential cross benefits between reforms to the appointment mechanism on other elements of the ISDS regime, including on independence and impartiality of arbitrators, on consistency and coherence in ISDS awards and on costs and duration of ISDs proceedings as well as overall consideration of transparency.
38. 工作组不妨考虑任用机制改革之间的潜在交叉利益在ISDS制度其他方面的可取性，包括仲裁员的独立性和公正性，仲裁裁决的一致性和连贯性，以及程序的费用和期限以及对透明度的全面考虑。
Preliminary views expressed by States
各国发表的初步意见
39. At its 35th session, the Working Group heard some preliminary views regarding possible reforms to the appointment mechanism for arbitrators.
39. 工作组在其第35届会议上听取了有关仲裁员委任机制进行合理的改革一些初步意见。
40. There were also calls for arbitral institutions to play a greater role in the selection of arbitrators, and to establish more transparent procedures regarding the appointment of arbitrators. It was pointed out that little information about selection methods resulted in limited accountability in the system. It was suggested that the selection criteria should be published along withe xplanation of the selections (A/CN.9/935, para. 66).
40. 还有人呼吁仲裁机构在选择仲裁员方面发挥更大作用，并建立更加透明的仲裁员指定程序。有人指出，关于指定方法的少量信息导致了系统中的有限问责制。有人建议，应公布评选标准并提供评选解释（A/CN.9/935，第66段）。
41. Those who considered that party appointment created systemic concerns suggested that the ISDS regime could envisage appointments/selection of decision makers not being made by the parties but by an independent body. From this perspective, it wassaid that without the creation of a body with permanent judges, it would be unlikely that the identified concerns could be solved. In that context, it was mentioned that mechanisms used in other international courts and bodies such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body could be considered (A/CN.9/935, para. 67).
41. 有人认为由当事人指定仲裁员会引发一系列问题，并建议ISDS制度拟构建由一个独立机构，而不是由当事人委任/选择决策者。从这个角度看，有人指出，如果不设立一个由常设法官组成的机构，已识别的问题就不大可能得到解决。在这种情况下，有人提到可以考虑使用在其他国际法院和机构，如WTO争端解决机构，所使用的机制（A/CN.9/935，第67段）。
42. In order to address the question of lack of diversity in ISDS, a suggestion was made to provide training to expand the pool of potential arbitrators and consider a roster system or systemic solution at a future time (A/CN.9/935, para. 74).
42. 为解决ISDS中缺乏多样性的问题，有人建议提供培训以增加适格仲裁员的人数，并在未来考虑制定名册系统或使用系统解决方案（A/CN.9/935，第74段）。
Further questions for consideration
其他需要考虑的问题
43. The Working Groupmay wish to note that the questions below are also discussed in document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, which provides a general framework for considering the desirability of reforms. The Working Group may also wish to take additional issues into consideration.
43. 工作组不妨注意到，A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149文件也讨论了下列问题，该文件为考虑改革的可取性提供了一个通用框架，工作组不妨考虑其他问题。
44. The Working Groupmay wish to consider the appointment mechanism, which has been designed to ensure flexibility and respect for party autonomy, but which has attracted criticism that arbitrators thus appointed lack legitimacy when addressing public interest issues. In this regard, the Working Group may wish to consider the issue of arbitrator remuneration. The Working Group may further wish to consider the mechanism in the context of its equivalent in other systems as discussed above.
44. 工作组不妨审议指定机制，该机制的目的是确保灵活性和尊重当事人的意思自治，但却在因解决公共利益问题时，仲裁员的指定不合法而饱受诟病。在这方面，工作组不妨审议仲裁员的薪酬问题。工作组不妨在上文讨论的同等机制的其他系统中进一步审议这一机制。
45. The Working Group may also wish to consider the impact of the appointment mechanism on the expected role of arbitrators. In terms of their duties, public judges often are bound by rules that require them to dismiss cases pending elsewhere, or to dismiss cases for which relief has already been sought in other proceedings. As has been highlighted in discussions of parallel proceedings, however, tribunals have in some cases seemed to view themselves as self-contained entities,handling the case before them and not feeling bound to consider what is happening or has happened in parallel proceedings, nor bound to consider the systemic issues that such parallel proceedings raise.
45. 工作组还不妨考虑指定机制对仲裁员预期作用的影响。就其职责而言，公共法官通常受到规则约束，这些规则要求他们解决在其他地方的未决案件，或者驳回已经在其他程序中得到救济的案件。然而，正如在平行程序的讨论中所强调的那样，在某些情况下仲裁庭似乎已经将自己视为独立实体，处理手头的案件，而不考虑在平行程序中正在发生或已经发生的情况，也无须考虑这些平行程序引起的系统性问题。
46. The Working Group may additionally wish to consider the questions of transparency in the appointment processes and the impact of the appointment mechanisms on the diversity of arbitrators appointed in ISDS cases.
46. 工作组还可以额外考虑指定过程的透明度问题以及指定机制对ISDS案件指定仲裁员的多样性的影响。
47. A further question for consideration would concern the authority of arbitrators, to consider certain issues of public interest, impacts of decisions onnon-parties, questions regarding the applicable standard of review, and whether and to what extent tribunals can scrutinize decisions of fact or law made at the domestic level. This matter concerns the inherent and implied powers of arbitral tribunals.
47. 另一个需要考虑的问题是仲裁员审议如下事项的权限：某些公共利益问题，裁定对非缔约国的影响，关于可适用的审查标准的问题，以及是否和在何种程度上审查法庭可以审查在国内作出的事实或法律决定。该问题涉及仲裁庭所固有和暗含的权力。
48. The Working Group may wish to consider whether diversity on adjudicatory bodies is necessary in its own right to enhance the legitimacy of a dispute settlement system in the public perception. In the current decentralized ad hoc framework, those in charge of selecting arbitrators are subject to little pressure to diversify appointments.This feature, coupled with the lack of transparency of the appointment process,entails that efforts to advance diversity depend exclusively on the goodwill and self-regulation of the actors involved in the arbitral process. However,the Working Group may also wish to consider whether a move towards a more centralized process of selecting decision makers will necessarily result ingreater diversity (or, alternatively, whether it could result in less diversity among decision makers). From this perspective, the Working Group may wish to consider the benefits of formal incorporation of diversity considerations into the selection criteria.
48. 工作组不妨考虑，审裁机构的多样性本身对于增强争端解决制度在公众认识中的合法性是否必要。在目前分散的临时框架中，负责选择仲裁员的人员在指定多样化方面几乎没有压力。这一特点加上任用过程缺乏透明度，使得促进多样性的努力完全取决于参与仲裁过程的行动者的善意和自我管制。但是，工作组也不妨考虑，转而采取一种更集中的程序来选择决策者，是否必然能够增强多样性（或者，是否会降低决策者的多样性）。从这个角度看，工作组不妨考虑将多样性考虑正式纳入选择标准的好处。
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