David Aven诉哥斯达黎加共和国案：环境管理全球公司（Urbaser）诉阿根廷案的余震？

在投资仲裁框架内，尤其是投资者与国家争端解决机制（ISDS）中对人权问题进行评估，是过去几年取得重大发展之一，甚至还为此专门成立了“商事与人权的国际仲裁小组”。由于传统观点认为只有国家属于遵守和履行保护人权义务的主体，仲裁庭经常会发现难以让投资者在投资运营期间对违反人权的行为负责。尽管个体和公司在国际层面上充当权利持有人这一观点早已被接受，但目前并没有多边协议规定私营实体具有尊重人权的一般义务。

投资者尊重人权的义务——何去何从？(quo vadis?)

随着跨境投资的作用和影响日益增大，虽然受制于实际操作和政治意愿的阻碍，该趋势仍有助于在国际层面设立投资者尽职调查义务制度。《人权理事会2014年倡议》中委托不限名额政府间工作小组来调查跨国公司和其他工商企业有关尊重人权的问题，可以被看做是这一方向的第一步。厄瓜多尔小组主席在《概念说明》中的第4段明确表示，“国际法律体系反映了跨国公司权利与义务的不对称性；通过诸如双边投资协议和自由贸易协定中的投资规则等硬性法律文书，跨国公司被授予权利，并可利用投资者与国家争端解决制度来维护其权利，然而却不存在任何硬性法律文书来规定公司尊重人权的义务”。虽然目前这种形式与向投资者直接强加国际义务还相距甚远，但这一动议很有可能会发展成为一种强有力的法律文件，并与投资者与国家争端解决领域遥相呼应。

目前的情况似乎表明，由于在国际投资协定（IIAs）中缺乏明确的规定，在主张投资者对侵犯人权的责任时，仲裁庭总是显得束手无策。即便存在这样的规定，其适用范围也可能发生改变，仅作为序言声明或企业社会责任条款可能不如纳入与人权相关的具体义务那样有效。但正如另一篇文章所述，虽然与这些义务的履行有关的一些问题仍待解决，新一代的国际投资协定似乎更倾向于遵循后一种方式。

环境管理全球公司（Urbaser）诉阿根廷案——第一次地震

如本文所述，投资仲裁庭以不同方式处理与人权有关的问题。其中最具争议性和影响力的是东道国对投资人侵犯人权的反请求。尽管这一问题可能带来若干程序上的障碍——尤其在管辖权方面——但考虑到人权问题在诸如环境保护等敏感问题上的突出性，仲裁庭在克服这些障碍方面似乎具有相当的创新性。正如在前一篇文章中所讨论的那样，可以从多角度来考量反诉的管辖权问题，但本文将主要关注最具争议的一个观点，即必须从国际投资协议的一般措辞中解读出允许的情形。

在环境管理全球公司（Urbaser）诉阿根廷一案中，仲裁庭做出的具有里程碑意义的裁决首次在这一主题上撼动了投资仲裁界。投资者声称，阿根廷在2001年金融危机后采取的紧急措施对布宜诺斯艾利斯的供水和污水处理服务的特许权受到不利影响，但未获得成功。阿根廷提出反请求称，特许公司未能对特许权提供必要的投资，导致侵犯人权，从而影响了该区域人民的健康和环境。不出所料的是，仲裁庭驳回了该反请求，指出投资者履行合同供水服务的义务源于国内法，而不是一般国际法，且后者不存在任何法律依据为个人群体向私人实体提出索赔或相应的赔偿。但是，如果戒除的义务——例如禁止犯下侵犯人权的行为——将受到威胁，情况会有所不同，因为这不仅会立即适用于国家，而且会立即适用于个人和其他私人当事方（第1210、1220段）。因此，通过多条附带条款的形式，仲裁庭宣布以一种革命性的方式处理投资仲裁中的人权问题。在成为首次对人权反请求主张管辖权的仲裁庭之后，它也成为首位宣布非国家行为者承担“不参与旨在摧毁”（第1199段）人权活动的义务的仲裁庭。该裁决强调两种制度的结合，表明投资仲裁庭已准备好履行人权义务。

David Aven诉哥斯达黎加共和国案——一次新的震动

David Aven诉哥斯达黎加案的最新裁决表明，地震的发生几乎不可能是孤立的事件。仲裁庭认为，受理该争议必须首先解决，其对在房地产项目运营期间对未公开湿地造成环境损害的反请求是否具有管辖权。需要从三个方面来考虑：（1）国际投资协议的相关规定，（2）投资仲裁的判例以及（3）程序经济和效率。

首先，那些较为笼统的相关环境条约规定，被解释为代表投资者遵守国内环境法律法规义务，以及遵守东道国为实施此类法律法规而采取的任何相应措施的来源;任何违反行为都将因此构成违反国内和国际法的行为，并将对所造成的损害承担责任（第734段）。仲裁庭为此做出大胆的决定，虽然环境法的执行主要针对的是国家，但并不接受外国投资者在这一领域不承担任何国际法义务（第737段）。

其次，根据环境管理全球公司（Urbaser）诉阿根廷一案中采用的方法，仲裁庭宣称“将不再认可国际经营的投资者不能成为国际法主体（......），特别在环境保护问题上，并涉及所有国家的权利和义务时（第737段）”。据此，并不存在任何实质性理由将投资者排除在主张范围之外，并将“投资争议”解释为包括引起反请求的争议，且基于程序经济和效率的附加原因对其主张管辖权（第740至742段）。

根据《贸易法委员会仲裁规则》第20条、第21条规定，哥斯达黎加的环境反请求由于未遵守相关的程序规则而最终被驳回（第744至747段）。此外，与先前的推理存在矛盾的是，仲裁庭还指出，协议的规定实际上并未“对投资者施加任何肯定义务”，也不支持主张违反国内颁布的环境法律法规的反请求（第743段）。尽管如此，由环境管理全球公司（Urbaser）诉阿根廷一案打开的缺口似乎已经扩大。如果一份裁决可能被视为单独的推理，那么两份裁决至少可以表明一种趋势的开始。事实上，一方面主张人权与企业和国际投资协定之间建立更为稳固的关系，另一方面，这也只是在投资者与国家争端解决体系中采取更加平衡的方法的全面努力中迈开的一步，这也可以确保其在以合法性危机为特点的时代中得以生存。

【英文原文】

David Aven v. Costa Rica: An After shock of Urbaser v.Argentina?

The assessment of human rights within an investment arbitration framework, typical for the investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS) mechanism, is one of the topics which has gained significant momentum in the past years, and has led even to the establishment of a Working Group on International Arbitration of Business and Human Rights. Arbitral tribunals often find it difficult to hold an investor accountable for breach of human rights during the operation of an investment because traditionally only States are considered to have the responsibility for their observance and enforcement. Although the idea of individuals and corporations acting as holders of rights on the international plane has been long accepted, no multilateral convention has yet recognized private entities’ general obligation to respect human rights.

Investors’ obligation to respect human rights – quo vadis?

The increased role and impact transnational investments play support the creation of a system of investor due diligence obligations at the international level, subject, of course, to the practical obstacles and the political will. A first step in this direction could be found in the 2014 initiative of the Human Rights Council entrusted to the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights. Paragraph 4 of the concept note proposed by the Ecuadorian chair of the group expressly acknowledged that “the international legal system reflects an asymmetry between rights and obligations of transnational corporations (TNCs); while TNCs are granted rights through hard law instruments, such as bilateral investment treaties and investment rules in free trade agreements, and have access to a system of investor-state dispute settlement, there are no hard law instruments that address the obligations of corporations to respect human rights”. Although far from imposing direct international obligations upon investors in its current form, this initiative has the potential of being developed into a powerful instrument, with echoes into the ISDS arena as well. 

The current state of affairs seems tosuggest that, in lack of specific language inserted in international investment agreements (IIAs), a tribunal has its hands tied when it comes to asserting an investor’s liability for breach of human rights. Even when such language exists, the range thereof might differ, as a mere preamble statement or a corporate social responsibility clause might not be as effective as the incorporation of specific human-rights-related obligations. New generation IIAs seem to follow the latter approach but, as explained in another post, a number of issues relating to the enforcement of such obligations remain open.

Urbaser v. Argentina – the first earthquake

As elaborated here, investment arbitration tribunals have dealt with issues relating to human rights in different ways.The most controversial and impactful one is represented by the formulation of a counterclaim by the host State for breach of human rights by the investor.Notwithstanding that this issue might entail several procedural hurdles –particularly in terms of asserting jurisdiction – tribunals seem to have become quite innovative in overcoming them considering the salience of human rights insensitive matters, such as environmental protection. As discussed in a previous post, there are numerous perspectives from which jurisdiction over a counterclaim can be assessed, but this post focuses on probably the most problematic one: the scenario in which consent must be derived from the general wording of the IIA.

The landmark decision rendered in Urbaserv. Argentina was the first one to shake the investment arbitration community on this topic. The investor unsuccessfully claimed that its concession for the supply water and sewerage services in Buenos Aires was adversely impacted by Argentina’s emergency measures adopted in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis. Argentina filed a counterclaim alleging that the concessionaire’s failure to provide the necessary level of investment in the concession led to violations of the human right to water, which consequently affected the population’s health and the environment in that region. Quite unsurprisingly, the tribunal dismissed the counterclaim, noting that the investor’s obligationto perform contractual water services had its source in domestic law, and not in general international law, and there was no legal ground under the latter to circumstantiate a claim or the corresponding compensation from a group of individuals for performance of services formulated against a private entity.However, the situation would be different if an obligation to abstain – such as a prohibition to commit acts violating human rights – would be at stake, as this would be of immediate application, not only upon States, but equally on individuals and other private parties (§§1210, 1220). Thus, by numerous obiterdicta, the tribunal proclaimed a revolutionary approach towards the role of human rights in investment arbitration. After being the first tribunal to assert jurisdiction over a human rights counterclaim, it also became the first to declare that non-State actors are under a negative obligation “not to engagein activity aimed at destroying” (§1199) human rights. Stressing upon the integrated nature of the two regimes, the decision signalled that investment tribunals are ready to account for and enforce human rights obligations.

David Aven v. Costa Rica – A new shock?

The recent decision in David Aven v. Costa Rica suggests that an earthquake is almost never an isolated occurrence. The tribunal empanelled to hear the dispute had to decide if it had jurisdiction over a counterclaim in relation to the environmental damage caused to undisclosed wetlands during the operation of a real estate project. This was looked at from three stances: (1) the language of the relevant IIA, (2) the investment arbitration case law and (3) procedural economy and efficiency.

First, the relevant treaty environmental language, rather general in nature, was interpreted as representing a source for the investors’ obligation to comply with the environmental domestic laws and regulations, and any corresponding measures adopted by the host State for the implementation of such norms; any breach thereof would amount to aviolation of domestic and international law and would trigger liability for the damages caused (§734). The tribunal courageously held that, although the enforcement of environmental law is primarily on the States, it cannot be accepted that a foreign investor could not be subjected to international law obligations in this field (§737).

Second, citing the approach adopted in Urbaser v. Argentina, the tribunal proclaimed that “it can no longer be admitted that investors operating internationally are immune from becoming subjects of international law (…) particularly when it comes to rights and obligations that are the concern of all States, as it happens in the protection of the environment” (§737). Consequently, it found no substantive reasons to exempt an investor from the scope of claims, and interpreted “an investment dispute” as covering disputes giving rise to counterclaims, asserting prima facie jurisdiction for additional reasons of procedural economy and efficiency (§§740-742).

Costa Rica’s environmental counterclaim was ultimately dismissed for non-observance of the procedural requirements set forth under Article 20 and 21 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules governing the proceeding (§§744-747). Also, the tribunal noted in passing and, somewhat contradictory to previous reasoning, that the treaty language did not actually“impose any affirmative obligations upon investors” nor supported a counterclaim for violation of state-enacted environmental regulation (§743).Still, the window opened by Urbaser v. Argentina seems to have been widened with this case. If one decision might be viewed as unique reasoning, two can at least signal the incipience of a trend. Indeed, the assertion of a more tenable link between human rights, on one side, and business and IIAs, on the otherv side, is just one step forward in the overall movement towards a more balanced approach in the ISDS system, which may also ensure its survival in these times characterized by a legitimacy crisis.

By Andreea Nica

                                                                                                                 来源：微信公众号 临时仲裁ADA