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欧盟成员国之间的依据《能源宪章条约》索赔:“瓦腾福”仲裁案铺平了道路

欧盟成员国之间依据《能源宪章条约》索赔:“瓦腾福”仲裁案裁定为此铺平了道路

 

Slovak RepublicAchmea B.V.一案中,欧盟法院(CJEU)就根据欧盟成员国之间的双边条约做出的仲裁裁决作出的裁定引起了广泛热议。法院作出裁定9个月后,一些仲裁庭方有机会探究原委。凭借一份72页详细的程序性决议,作为思想之源,简单明了地证实了ICSID在瑞士能源公司瓦腾福和德国的之间的争议一案有管辖权,该争议是在福岛核泄漏的影响下,德国停止核能引发的依据《能源宪章条约》进行索赔(ICSID案号:ARB/ 12/12)。

瓦腾福仲裁庭对德国基于Achmea案例提出的管辖权异议予以驳回值得进一步分析:首先,Achmea案援引《能源宪章条约》提出的索赔请求引起了激烈的争论,特别是《能源宪章条约》索赔的待决索赔的实际影响和数量。最近欧盟委员会明确表示,它认为应驳回Achmea公司援引《能源宪章条约》在欧盟成员国提出的索赔请求。其次,作为国际公法的一部分,仲裁庭深入研究了欧盟法律与投资条约之间错综复杂的关系。

 

仲裁庭采用了不同的做法,然而所有的做法都殊途同归。

 

仲裁庭对援引Achmea案例提出的众多案件的管辖权异议作出了不同的处理。在Masdar Solar SpainICSID案号:ARB/14/1)一案中,仲裁庭驳回了西班牙要求沿袭Achmea一案的做法进行重启仲裁的请求,简易地处理了这个问题之后总结道,“Achmea一案的判决对《能源宪章条约》只字未提。”“ICSID仲裁庭在GavrilovicRepublic of Croatia 一案中(ICSID案号:ARB/12/39)根据奥克双边投资协定,援引Achmea案例,由于克罗地亚较晚介入并被限制就问题进行正式审查,驳回了克罗地亚关于欧盟成员国之间仲裁的反对意见。

与此相反,瓦腾福仲裁庭认为德国在Achmea一案之后提出的的反对意见是适时的。欧盟法院判决本身就构成了一个新的事实,即德国此前并不知道 ICSID411)条这一内容。该仲裁庭进一步强调其根据 ICSID规则审议管辖问题的职权,并指出,即使德国没有提出反对意见,它也认为自己有权审议欧盟成员国间的问题。

最近,根据《法匈投资协定》UP and C.D Holding InternationaleHungary一案(ICSID案号:ARB/13/35)仲裁庭,以与瓦腾福仲裁庭相近似的理由驳回了援引Achmea案例提出的反对意见,仲裁庭认为,匈牙利不能依靠欧盟法律以及Achmea案例的做法规避ICSID公约中所规定的国际公法义务。

总之,各仲裁庭都未采取Achmea案例的做法,以各种缘由维持对案件的管辖权。

 

瓦腾福仲裁庭:欧盟法律没有优先性

 

瓦腾福仲裁庭根据ECT26条的争端解决条款确定管辖权,并质疑道,在按照国际法原则对该条款解释时,欧盟法律是否对该含义产生影响。虽然仲裁庭承认欧盟条约以及CJEU的判决是国际法的一部分,但并不认可欧盟法律可以作为解释《能源宪章条约》第26条的手段。

仲裁庭认为,《维也纳条约法公约》(VCLT)第31条内没有任何词句规定参照欧盟条约(从而间接地参照Achmea一案)来解释《能源宪章条约》。它最终认为,欧盟法律不足以构成“可用于探究《多边能源宪章条约》第26条含义的国际法原则,因为欧盟法并非可用来解释和适用(如《能源宪章条约》)中仲裁条款的普通法律”。

如果解释多边条约时适用欧盟法律,瓦腾福仲裁庭担心对ECT同一条款可能会有不同的解释。这将不能达到同一法律适用的结果,与ECT的客观和主观目的都不一致,相反,条约必守以及诚实信用原则内在要求该条约的解释具有唯一性,《维也纳条约法公约》(VCLT)第31C)条规定,在解释某一条约时,与双方有关的任一国际法规则都应予以考虑,不能依凭“重新改写条约,或用其他与待解释的条款无关的国际法规则简单地词义替换来解释,这种解释将会有违该条文的原意”。

 

Vattenfall: ECT16条是证实管辖权的简易途径

仲裁庭着重强调了ECT16条,该条规定:没有条款对在ECT的第三部分或第五部分之前或随后的双方或多方国际协议中规定,该条款可以与ECT的第26条规定相出入,ECT条款更加倾向支持投资者或者投资事宜,仲裁庭表示,如果欧盟法律禁止仲裁,它将涉及与ECT26条等相同的主题,而第26条允许仲裁,因此ECT26条“对投资者更有利”。因此,第16条要求以第26条为准。仲裁庭认为,与其他理由相比,ECT16条更简单明了地规定了解决管辖权争议的途径。同样,在Masdar SolarSpain案中,仲裁庭也援引了ECT16条的规定。(Masdar裁决第332段)。

仲裁庭并未注意到ECT26条和TFEU267344条之间的冲突,但顺便说一句,即使存在此类冲突,欧盟法律也没有优先性,应适用各种各样的冲突规则,根据VCLT304)(a)的后法优于先法(lex posterior)规定,根据VCLT411)(a)的ECT修改,或将ECT16条和TFEU351条的特别法(lex specialis)。回到ECT16条,仲裁庭认为该条款是特别法,再次得出结论“第16条否定了被申请人认为欧盟法律相较于第16条具有优先性的论点”。有人认为ECT16条不是一项合适的冲突规则,因为它本身是冲突制度体系的一部分,因此不能有效地反驳这种观点。《公约》第41条所载(一般)国际公法规则限制多边协定可由双方修改的情况,导致了同样的结果,并加强了第16条第1款的效力。

此外,仲裁庭强调,它认为起草者在确定《投资条约》规定的义务范围方面发挥关键作用。在ECT的案件中,也有充分的理由提出欧盟成员国之间的索赔请求,因为“起草ECT让26条不适用于欧盟成员国的投资者和另一个欧盟成员国之间的争端是一件简单的事情,但并没有如此约定。”

 

评  论

 

仲裁庭仍在着手解决欧盟成员国之间争议的索赔问题,尤其是ECT案件,必然会更加关注审慎作出的Vattenfall裁决。它的推理很可能成为在类似案件中作出进一步裁决的蓝图。

CJEU的判决与Vattenfall的裁决相对比,明显发现欧盟机构和国际仲裁庭从截然不同的角度看待这个问题。CJEU的主要任务是解释和确保欧盟法律的优先性,而仲裁庭则须将各国根据各自投资条约所承担的义务付诸实施。这些不同的观点必然会影响不同主体的推理和处理方法:CJEU援引的是欧盟法律的原则,而仲裁庭的裁决则基于国际公法。对于欧盟内部的ISDS导致的规范冲突,现在由国家和投资者共同支付。

这个问题仍然处于不断变化之中:在Svea上诉法院撤销ECT裁决(SCC案号063/2016)的背景下,西班牙已经要求瑞典法院从CJEU寻求关于ECT是否符合欧盟法律的初步裁决。这一决定将使CJEU对多边条约的立场更加明确。与此同时,在大西洋彼岸,美国哥伦比亚特区地方法院(USDistrict Court of the District of Columbia)被要求就西班牙反对执行援引Achmea案例的Novenergia裁决的动议做出裁定。除了对ECT表示“支持“”或“反对”之外,人们可能会感到困惑,在欧盟成员国之间的投资保护方面,欧盟法与(其他)国际公法之间的重叠会对国际公法的裁决产生影响。

 

英文原文

 

Intra-EU ECT Claims Post-Achmea:Vattenfall Decision Paves the Way

 

The Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) judgment in Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V. (Achmea) on arbitration under intra-EU BITs has been broadly discussed (on this blog, see e.g. here, here, here, here, here, here and here). Nine months after the Court’s ruling, some tribunals have had the opportunity to react. Food for thought and a strikingly straight forward solution comes especially by way of a detailed 72-page procedural decision confirming jurisdiction in the ICSID arbitration between Swedish power company Vattenfall and Germany regarding claims under the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) following the state’s phaseout of nuclear power in the wake of the Fukushima disaster (ICSID Case No.ARB/12/12).

The Vattenfall-tribunal’s rejection of Germany’s Achmea-based jurisdictional objection warrants closer analysis: First, Achmea’s reach to ECT-based claims has been hotly debated, not least because of the practical significance and number of pending ECT-claims. The European Commission recently communicated in unequivocal terms that it sees intra-EU ECT-claims as barred by Achmea. Second, the tribunal delves deep into the complex and arguably uneasy relationship between EU law and investment treaties as part of public international law.

Tribunals Take Different Roads, Yet All Roads Lead to Rome

Various Achmea-based jurisdictional objections have found different treatment by tribunals. In Masdar Solar v Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1), the tribunal denied Spain’s request to reopen the arbitration following Achmea, briefly addressing the issue and concluding that the “Achmea Judgment is simply silent on the subject of the ECT.” An ICSID tribunal in Gavrilovic v Republic of Croatia (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/39) under the Austria-Croatia BIT dismissed Croatia’s intra-EU objection after Achmea for being late and refrained from an ex officio review of the issue.

In contrast, the Vattenfall-tribunal found Germany’s objection – not raised prior to Achmea – to be timely. The “very existence” of the CJEU’s judgment amounted to a new fact that was previously unknown to Germany in terms of ICSID Rule 41(1). The tribunal further highlights its ex officio authority to consider jurisdictional issues under the ICSID Rules, remarking that it would have seen fit to consider the intra-EU issue, even if Germany had not raised the objection.

Recently, a tribunal in UP and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35) under the France-Hungary BIT rejected Achmea-based objections on grounds similar, yet not identical, to those relied on by the Vattenfall-tribunal: Hungary could not, says that tribunal, rely on EU law and Achmea to escape its public international law obligations under the ICSID Convention (not the BIT).

In conclusion: Tribunals have unanimously remained unimpressed by Achmea, while the underlying reasons to uphold jurisdiction are manifold.

 

Vattenfall: No Primacy of EU Law

The Vattenfall tribunal identifies thedispute resolution provision of the ECT, Article 26, as the starting point forits jurisdictional analysis, and queries whether EU law has consequences forthe meaning of that provision when interpreted in accordance with theprinciples of international law. While the tribunal acknowledges that the EUTreaties and the CJEU’s judgments interpreting them form part of internationallaw, it does not accept EU law as means to interpret Article 26 ECT.

In the tribunal’s view, there is no room within Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to draw from EU Treaties (and thus indirectly from Achmea) to interpret another treaty, the ECT. It concludes that EU law does not constitute “principles of international law which may be used to derive meaning from Article 26 ECT, since [EU law] is not general law applicable as such to the interpretation and application of the arbitration clause in another treaty such as the ECT”.

The Vattenfall tribunal is concerned about potentially different interpretations of the same ECT provision if EU law was used for interpreting the multilateral treaty. This would result in an “incoherent and anomalous result” that would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the ECT. Instead, “pacta sunt servanda and good faith require that the terms of that treaty have a single consistent meaning”. Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, which states that any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties should be taken into account when interpreting a treaty, could not be relied upon to “rewrite the treaty being interpreted, or to substitute a plain reading of a treaty provision with other rules of international law, external to the treaty being interpreted, which would contradict the ordinary meaning of its terms”.

 

Vattenfall: Article 16 ECT as a Simple Route to Jurisdiction

The arbitrators notably accentuate Article 16 ECT, which states that no provisions concerning the subject matter of Part III or V of the ECT in prior or subsequent international agreements between two or more parties to the ECT shall be construed to derogate from i.a. Article 26 ECT, where the provision in the ECT is more favourable to the investor or investment. If EU law were to prohibit arbitration, says the tribunal, it would concern the same subject matter as Article 26 ECT, the latter allowing for arbitration and thus being “more favourable to the Investor” in terms of Article 16 ECT. Article 16 ECT would thus require Article 26 ECT to prevail. Article 16 ECT is identified by the arbitrators as “a simpler and clearer route to the answer to the jurisdictional challenge” than other reasons provided.Similarly, but slightly less prominently, the tribunal in Masdar Solar v Spainalso relied on Article 16 ECT (cf. para. 332 of the Masdar award).

The arbitrators do not see a conflict between Article 26 ECT and Articles 267, 344 TFEU, but remark obiter dictum that even if such a conflict existed, EU law would not prevail over the ECT,applying a variety of conflict rules – lex posterior pursuant to Article 30(4)(a) VCLT, modification of the ECT in light of Article 41(1) VCLT, or lex specialis with a view to Articles 16 ECT and 351 TFEU. Returning to Article 16ECT, the tribunal considers the provision to be lex specialis, once more concluding that “Article 16 poses an insurmountable obstacle to Respondent’s argument that EU law prevails over the ECT”. This view is not effectively countered by arguing that Article 16 ECT is not a suitable conflict rule because it is itself part of one of the conflicting regimes. The (general) public international law rule enshrined in Article 41 VCLT, limiting the casesin which multilateral agreements can be bilaterally modified, leads to the same result and reinforces the effectiveness of Article 16 ECT.1)

Additionally, the tribunal emphasises thatit sees a critical role with drafters to define the scope of the obligations established by the investment treaty. In case of the ECT, there was ample opportunity to carve out intra-EU claims, since it “would have been a simple matter to draft the ECT so that Article 26 does not apply to disputes between an Investor of one EU Member State and another EU Member State as respondents.That was not done”.

 

Commentary

Tribunals still grappling with the intra-EU question, especially those in ECT cases, are certain to pay great attention to the carefully crafted Vattenfall decision. Its reasoning may well serve as a blueprint for further decisions and awards in similar cases.

Reading the CJEU’s judgment side-by-side with the Vattenfall decision puts the spotlight on the starkly different perspectives from which the EU institutions and international arbitral tribunals look at the issue. The CJEU’s principal task is to interpret and ensure the primacy of EU law, whereas arbitral tribunals are obliged to put into effect the mutual obligations of states under their respective investment treaties. These distinct viewpoints necessarily shape reasoning and methodology of the different actors: The CJEU relies on principles of EU law, whereas arbitral tribunals base their decisions on public international law. Forintra-EU ISDS, this has resulted in norm conflicts that are now paid for by states and investors alike.

The issue remains in flux: In the context of an action to annul an ECT award at the Svea Court of Appeal (SCC Case No.063/2016, Novenergia v Spain), Spain has asked the Swedish court to seek a preliminary ruling on the ECT’s compatibility with EU law from the CJEU. Such decision would bring clarity with respect to the CJEU’s position on them ultilateral treaty. In parallel, on the other side of the Atlantic, the US District Court of the District of Columbia is called to decide on Spain’s motion resisting enforcement of the Novenergia award based on Achmea. Beyond a “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” for the ECT, one may curiously expect a ruling on the public international law implications of the overlap between EU law and (other) public international law when it comes to intra-EU investment protection.

 

By Kirstin Schwedt, Hannes Ingwersen

 

 

  

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