日本商事仲裁协会出台并修改了一系列新规则
(2019年1月1日生效)
概 述
近日日本商事仲裁协会(JCAA)发布公告称,将修改现行两套仲裁规则,同时也将引入一套创新性的规则,旨在提供高效便民、费用亲民的大陆法系式仲裁。这一系列新规将于2019年1月1日生效。
JCAA在最初就草案向公众征求意见时,坦承到:“JCAA在解决国际争端方面作用甚微。”“新规的明确目标就是通过建立一种吸引各种商事活动的独特仲裁模式来改变这一现状。”因此,这些新规(下文将探讨其中的重要特征)似乎开创了三级系统:
(1)经修订的《贸易法委员会仲裁行政规则(管理规则)》适用于最复杂和标的额最高的国际争端。
(2)修改后的商事仲裁规则(商事规则)实际上是JCAA的主要仲裁规则,改规则更加注重成本效率。
(3)新颁布的交互仲裁规则(交互规则)中优先考虑成本效率。
1. 管理规则
《管理规则》授权JCAA根据《联合国国际贸易法委员会仲裁规则》管理仲裁。由于《联合国国际贸易法委员会仲裁规则》是临时仲裁规则的,《管理规则》的立法目的在于:“使《联合国国际贸易法委员会仲裁规则》作为机构仲裁规则有效运作的最基本条件”。
最有实际意义的是增加了涉及仲裁员的薪酬条款。具体如下:
(1)由JCAA综合考虑仲裁员的资历和案件的复杂性,按每小时500美元至1500美元计算仲裁员的报酬(第20条)。
(2)仲裁员从事仲裁若干小时后(《商事规则》中规定的为150小时)不得降低其费率(第21条)。
(3)如果将延长程序,经双方同意,JCAA可以在仲裁终止前向仲裁员支付报酬(规则22.2)
这使得JCAA在仲裁员薪酬方面,与区域内其他国际机构(像SIAC以及HKIAC)保持在相同的水平,JCAA以往一直以仲裁员报酬低廉著称。正如JCAA在其解释综述中所言,上述(a)处的修改将更容易任命“优秀的国际专家担任仲裁员”,而增加了(b)和(c)使得《行政规则》更易于处理繁杂的案件。
尽管这些修改备受好评,但当事人则倾向于选择自己制定规则的机构。因此,对于这些修改是否会吸引更多的国际当事人选择将国际贸易争议提交JCAA仲裁,以及在何种情况下它们可能选择这样做。
2,商事规则
JCAA对待新商事规则的态度明显不同。新规则在提高效率、保护质疑仲裁员方面做了一些创新性。与此同时,这些修改之处对仲裁员的酬劳方面也做了更加严苛的限制,这一举措可能会束缚优秀仲裁员按照商事规则行事。
最重要的修改如下:
(1)仲裁员调查可能存在的利益冲突是其明确持续的职责(第24条)——特别是现在要求候选仲裁员在接受任命之前以及在任命期间对是否存在任何潜在利益冲突进行一项“合理调查”。这一措辞源于日本最高法院2017年的一项判决。(请见我们的博客链接)
(2)关于仲裁庭秘书职责的详细规定(第33条)——重要的补充:(i)只有在双方正式核实任命建议详细后方可任命仲裁庭秘书;(ii)仲裁庭秘书不能从事可能会对仲裁庭的裁决产生“严重影响”的事项(iii)将从任命仲裁员的费用中支付仲裁庭秘书的酬劳。
(3)仲裁庭有权拒绝接受当事人晚交的证据(第41条)——虽然通常情况下,仲裁庭都有这项权利,但本条强调了JCAA希望赋予仲裁庭权力,让仲裁庭态度强势,更严格地执行程序规范。
(4)将作出裁决的期限从6个月延长到9个月(第43条)——虽然此处修改备受好评,但即使延长9个月的期限也过短,不能够解决最直接的争端。因此,目前还不清楚将如何强调实现这些目标。
(5)不得“以任何方式”泄露少数意见(第63条)—— JCAA在其解释综述中证实,这一增加是为了避免:(i)可能对裁决提出的异议;(ii)当事人选任的仲裁员有为当事人泄露异议之嫌。这是一种创新,并且比其他大多数机构的规则都明确,这些规则要么对少数意见保持沉默(LCIA规则),要么只允许通知裁决之外的各方当事人(ICC规则)。让我们拭目以待,这一限制在实践中如何发挥作用,以及最后它是否会被其他机构采用。
(6)将适用快速程序的范围扩大到争议标的5000万日元(约400000美元)(第84条)——这表明了标的额从2000万日元增加到5000万日元,但仍远低于其他机构如ICC(200万美元),HKIAC(约320万美元)或是SIAC(约440万美元)。这表明,本来适合加速程序的小额争端只有在当事各方协议适用这些规则时才能使用,但往往一旦发生争议,则不太可能达成协议。
(7)仲裁员报酬——新商事规则对仲裁员报酬作了详细修改。其中最基本的是:
A.对所有的仲裁员不论其资历或是案件的复杂性均按每小时5万日元支付报酬(第93.2条)。这低于《管理规则》规定的最低时薪(500美元),也远低于其他机构的时薪上限,比如HKICA的时薪上线约为94500日元。
B.在审理案件150小时后(现行规则下为60小时),仲裁员的报酬降低10%,此后每50小时再降一次,最高可达50%(第九十五条)
C.独任仲裁员就单个案件取的费用上限为3 000万日元(按照标的额递减值)——在三个人合议庭的情况下,共同仲裁员的费用上限为这个数字此数额的80%,首席仲裁员的费用上限为此数额的120%(第九十四条)。
D.当事人可在仲裁庭组成之前达成书面协议修改时薪,报酬上限或者有计划地递减报酬,但不能低于《商事规则》规定的数额,也不能在组成仲裁庭后双方再达成书面协议修改(97和98条)。
这些修改的主要影响是严格规制仲裁员的酬劳。尽管这本应该受到普遍好评,因为过低的时薪可能会让许多资深国际仲裁员无法按照JCAA的《商事规则》进行仲裁,而且,一旦此举被接受,可能会立即有人要求撤销申请(实践中这些规则中经常会有诸如此类事情发生)。鉴于JCAA对这些管理规则的态度,目前尚不清楚这些修订后的商事规则能在多大程度上适用,尤其在多大程度上能适用于顶级国际纠纷。
3.交互规则
新的交互规则是建立在新的商事规则的基础上。绝大多数的条款是相同的,但为了响应JCAA所确定的三个关键问题也做出了一些重大的修改:(i)裁决冗长;(ii)代理律师经常为谋利而增加讼累,(iii)逐年递增的费用。
JCAA的措施分为以下两类:
(1)仲裁庭的究问式/审问式审理方法:
《交互规则》第48条规定,仲裁庭需今早与各方当事人沟通事实问题和法律问题的立场,并将该文件通知给各方当事人,然后,双方对该文件作出评议,其立场的摘要可作为仲裁裁决的依据。
根据第五十六条的规定,仲裁庭在决定是否需要开庭审理前,还必须罗列出其认为重要的事实和法律问题、仲裁庭对这些问题的初步看法以及仲裁庭认为重要的其他事项。这些意见对随后的最终裁决不具约束力,因此不构成对仲裁员提出质疑的理由。
新出台的《交互规则》似乎借鉴了即将于2018年12月18日发布的《布拉格国际仲裁有效行为新规则》的许多特点,该规则将侧重于采用大陆法系的方式进行国际仲裁。仲裁庭更具能动性的职责是是提高可预测性以及尽早厘清争议焦点。我们也希望这次讨论将有助于解决问题。这对某些当事方来说可能是一个有建设性的提议,彰显了一种真正具有创新性的仲裁办法。然而,正如JCAA所坦言,规定仲裁庭表明对案件的初步意见,可能会牵涉到具有普通法背景的代理人和当事人,他们可能认为这侵犯了当事人获得公平庭审的权利。这种模式在实践中是否可取,时间会告诉我们答案。
(2)固定费用——根据索赔金额确定仲裁员的费用(根据第94和95条的规定,独任仲裁员处理最高额争议的费用不超过500万日元)。有趣的是,如果当事各方在裁决作出之前(在组成仲裁庭之后)撤回申请(第97.1条),而且仲裁庭秘书将由其任命的仲裁员直接偿还费用(第33.4条),仍需全额支付固定费用。
JCAA宣称,这种固定的收费机制是为了确保仲裁员以公正廉洁而非谋求经济利益所驱动,从而更有效地处理案件。然而,根据《商事规则》每小时5万日元的费率,在《交互规则》规定该固定费用之前,独任仲裁员在处理最复杂、标的额最高的案件上最多只会工作120小时。鉴于仲裁庭在审讯之外所需要做的额外工作,仲裁员对这种固定的收费结构是否满意仍有待定论。
结 论
在最近的一次商事规则修订四年后出台了这些新规,这无疑彰显了JCAA努力打造为一个值得信任的国际仲裁机构的雄心。
实施的一些创新——尤其是交互规则——是开创性的,可能会印证JCAA将所说的,他将提供一套独特的多样化规则。然而,在建立一个三层系统方面,可能会有问题,尤其是商业规则——据悉,目前最流行的复杂国际仲裁——包括过于严苛的限制费用,将很难邀请到相应资质与声誉的仲裁员。同样,对于许多国际当事方是否会选择将国际贸易争议提交JCAA仲裁也不得而知。
JCAA向来善于创造、敢于当担,前进之路的各种挑战,将不断砥砺我们勇于创新。
【英文原文】
JCAA Announces New Sets of Rules
Overview
The Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) has issued an announcement that it is (i) amending its two current sets of arbitration rules and (ii) introducing a revolutionary set of rules designed to provide efficient and cheap civil-law style arbitration.
In its introduction to an initial call for public comments on the drafts, the JCAA made the frank admission that it: “has yet toplay a significant role in the resolution of international disputes.” The clear motivation for these new rules is to change this by offering a unique arbitration model that is attractive to a wide range of businesses. Accordingly, the new sets of rules (the key features of whichare explored below) seem to create a three tiered-system:
The amended Administrative Rules for UNCITRAL Arbitration (Administrative Rules) for the most complex and high value international disputes
The amended Commercial Arbitration Rules (Commercial Rules) – effectively the JCAA’s main set of arbitral rules – where cost efficiency is a greater priority.
The newly enacted Interactive Arbitration Rules (Interactive Rules) where cost efficiency is paramount.
The new sets of rules will come into force on 1 January 2019.
1. Administrative Rules
The Administrative Rules allow the JCAA to administer arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Since the UNCITRAL Rules are designed for ad hoc arbitration, the Administrative Rules are designed to provide: “the minimum essentials to make the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules operate effectively as institutional arbitration rules” (emphasis added).
The most significant additions relate to the remuneration of arbitrators. Specifically:
a. Arbitrators’ fees will be fixed at an hourly rate between USD 500 to 1,500 per hour by the JCAA; considering the arbitrator’s experience and the complexity of the case (Rule 20).
b. No reduction in the arbitrators’ rates after a certain number of hours (in the case of the Commercial Rules, 150 hours) (Rule 21).
c If proceedings are expected to be prolonged, the JCAA may pay an arbitrator their remuneration before the termination of proceedings with the parties’ consent (Rule 22.2).
This puts the JCAA at a similar level to other international institutions in the region (e.g., SIAC and HKIAC) as regards the remuneration of arbitrators, where previously the JCAA had a reputation for keeping such fees low. As the JCAA confirms in its explanatory overview,the change at (a) above will make it easier to appoint: “prominent international experts to serve as arbitrators” while the additions at (b) and (c) render the Administrative Rules more suitable for long and complex cases.
Although these changes are welcome, parties tend to choose institutions for their own rules. It is therefore unclear whether these changes will lead to more international parties choosing the JCAA to administer their UNCITRAL arbitrations and in what circumstances they might choose to do so.
2. Commercial Rules
The JCAA’s approach to the new Commercial Rules is markedly different. The new rules make some inventive changes designed to remove inefficiencies and protect against challenges / appeals. At the same time, the changes place heavier restrictions on arbitrators’ fees which might dissuade top-tier arbitrators from acting under the Commercial Rules.
The most important alterations are as follows:
a. Explicit ongoing duties for arbitrators to investigate potential conflicts of interest (Article24) – in particular, potential arbitrators are now required to conduct a “reasonable investigation” into the existence of any potential conflicts of interest both prior to accepting an appointment and on an ongoing basis during their appointment. This wording reflects a 2017 ruling of the Supreme Court of Japan (please see our blog post at the link here).
b. Detailed rules regarding the role of the Tribunal Secretary (Article 33) – key additions require that a tribunal secretary: (i) is appointed only after a detailed proposal is formally approved by both parties; (ii) cannot perform tasks that could “substantially influence” the tribunal’s decision; and (iii) will be paidout of the fee cap of the appointing arbitrator.
c. Explicit right for the Tribunal to reject evidence submitted in an untimely manner (Article41) – whilst tribunals generally have such a right, this provision emphasises the JCAA’s desire to empower tribunals to take a less permissive attitude and enforce procedural propriety more rigorously.
d.Increased target time for rendering an award from 6 months to 9 months (Article 43) – though this is a welcome change, it seems likely that even the extended target of nine months will be too short for anything more that the most straight forward of disputes. As such, it isunclear how much emphasis will be placed on meeting such targets.
e. No dissenting opinion may be disclosed “in any manner” (Article 63) – in its explanatory overview, the JCAA confirms that this addition is designed to avoid: (i) potential challenges to awards; and (ii) any temptation for party-appointed arbitrators to give dissenting opinions to show loyalty to their appointers. This is innovative and goes beyond most other institutional rules, which are either silent on dissenting opinions (LCIA Rules) or only permit notification to the parties outside of the award (ICC Rules). It will be interesting to see how this restriction works in practice and if it is eventually adopted by other institutions.
f. Increase in scope of automatic expedited procedures tocover disputes up to JPY 50 million (around USD 400,000) (Article 84) – this represents an increase from JPY 20 million but is still far below other institutions like the ICC (USD 2 million), HKIAC (around USD 3.2 million) or SIAC (around USD 4.4 million). This could mean that smaller disputes that would otherwise be suited to the expedited process will rely on the agreement of the parties to apply such rules; something less likely to occur once a dispute hasstarted.
g. Arbitrators’ Remuneration – the new Commercial Rules introduce detailed changes to arbitrators’ remuneration. The most fundamental of these are as follows:
All arbitrators paid a fixed hourly rate of JPY 50,000 regardless of experience or the complexity of the case (Article 93.2). This is lower than the lowest hourly rate possible under the Administrative Rules (USD500) and much lower than other institutions’ hourly-rate caps, e.g., the HKIAC’s cap is around JPY 94,500.
After 150 hours working on the case (up from 60 hours under the current rules), the arbitrator’s rates are reduced by 10%, and againfor every 50 hours thereafter to a maximum of 50% (Article 95).
The upper limit of a sole arbitrator’s fees for one matter is JPY 30 million (and this is reduced depending on the value of the dispute) – in three person tribunals the co-arbitrators’ cap is 80% of this figure and the chairperson’s cap is 120% (Article 94).
The parties may agree in writing before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal to amend the hourly rate, fee cap or planned reduction but the amendment cannot be less favourable to the arbitrators than the position under the Commercial Rules and no changes are possible (even with both parties’ agreement) once the tribunal has been constituted (Articles 97 and 98)
The overriding impact of the changes is to tightly limit arbitrators’ fees. While this should generally be welcomed, the low hourly rates may put off many senior international arbitrators from taking appointments under JCAA commercial Rules arbitrations and, if accepted, there will likely be immediate requests to dis-apply (something we have seen happen under these rules regularly in practice). Given its approach to the Administrative Rules, where the focus is on making it easier to appoint prominent international experts as arbitrators, it is unclear at what level the JCAA is pitching these revised Commercial Rules and particularly how far they are intended to provide for top-tier international disputes.
3. Interactive Rules
The new Interactive Rules are based on the new Commercial rules. The vast majority of the provisions are identical but there are some significant changes designed to respond to three key issues identified by the JCAA: (i) awards are unnecessarily long; (ii) lawyers often do unnecessary work with the benefit of hindsight; and (iii) costs are increasing year-on-year.
The JCAA’s solutions fall into two categories:
a) Inquisitorial / interventionist approach from thetribunal:
Article 48 of the Interactive Rules requires the tribunal to share with the parties, as early as possible, a document summarising the parties’ positions and the factual and legal issues that arise.The parties then comment on this document and the summary of their positions may be used as the basis for the arbitral award.
Under Article 56, before making a decision on whether a hearing is necessary, the tribunal must also set out the factual and legal issues it considers important, its preliminary views on the same, and any othermatters the tribunal deems important. These views are not binding on the subsequent final award and so will not be grounds for a challenge against any arbitrator.
The new Interactive Rules appear to take many qualities from the new Prague Rules on Efficient Conduct of International Arbitration that are due for release on 18 December 2018, which will focus on a civil law approach to international arbitration. The tribunal’s more active role is designed to improve predictability and narrow the issues in disputeearly. We would also expect this to encourage settlement discussions. This may be an attractive proposition to some parties and represents a genuinely innovative approach to arbitration. However, as acknowledged by the JCAA, the requirement for the tribunal to announce preliminary views will likely concern practitioners and parties from a common law background who may view this as infringing the parties’ right to a fair hearing. Time will tell whether this model will prove popular in practice.
b) Fixed fees – arbitrators’ fees are fixed depending on the value of the claim (up to JPY 5 million for a sole arbitrator working on highest value claims under Articles 94 and 95). Interestingly, the fixed fee is still paid in full if the parties’ withdraw the claims prior to the award (but after the constitution of the tribunal) (Article 97.1), and any tribunal secretary is to be reimbursed directly by the appointing arbitrator (Article33.4).
The JCAA heralds this fixed fee structure as ensuring that arbitrators are motivated by integrity rather than economic reward and so work more efficiently on cases. However, based on the Commercial Rules’ hourly rate of JPY 50,000, a sole arbitrator would only be able to worka maximum 120 hours on the most complex and high value case before exceeding the fixed fee under the Interactive Rules. Given the additional work required by the Tribunal in some areas under the inquisitorial style of arbitration, it remains to be seen whether arbitrators will be comfortable committing to this fixed fee structure.
Conclusion
These new rules, coming only four years after the most recent update to the Commercial Rules (please see our blog post on this update at the link here), clearly demonstrate the JCAA’s ambitions to improve its reputation as a viable institution for international arbitration.
Some of the innovations implemented – particularly the Interactive Rules – are ground-breaking and may help to justify the JCAA’s claim that it will provide a uniquely diverse set of rules. However, in establishing a three-tiered approach, there may be concerns that the Commercial Rules in particular – understood to be the most popular for complex international arbitration at the moment – include overly stringent restrictions on fees that will make it difficult to attract arbitrators of the requisite quality and reputation. Likewise, it is unclear whether many international parties will pick the JCAA to administer their UNCITRALarbitrations above other institutions.
The JCAA has been inventive and brave; the challenge willbe encouraging parties to embrace this bold new approach.
By David Gilmore
来源:微信公众号 临时仲裁ADA

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